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I SPY: THE NEWSGATHERER UNDER COVER
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
I. INTRODUCTION
Hysteria about the press, like the flu, breaks out periodically,
and when it does, few of us are better off for having lived through
the experience. We are currently on what I sincerely hope will prove
to be the receding edge of the latest epidemic of public outrage about
the press, and, as usual, the frenzied state has not brought out the
best in either the media or its critics.1
Disgust over the gross and moronic photographic frenzy that
preceded and memorialized the dying moments of Britain's Princess
Diana (and perhaps contributed to the accident that killed her)
added fuel to efforts by celebrities in the United States to pass laws
to stifle the ever-present paparazzi (and, perhaps predictably, to
hamper what many would argue is valuable investigative reporting
in the process).2 Investigative reporting, many allege, has become
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. B.A., Beaver College; J.D.,
Columbia University. I would like to thank my research assistant, James Wheaton, for his
invaluable help and the Filomen and Max D'Agostino Research Fund for its continued support
of my work.
1. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis were inspired by the excesses of "yellow"
journalism in the last quarter of the 19th century to write their famous law review article
advocating a right of privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Journalistic historians Michael and Edwin Emery note
that yellow journalists of that time shared characteristics in common with modem tabloid
journalism-exaggeration, "made up" material, and sensationalism. See MICHAEL EMERY &
EDWIN EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 194
(7th ed. 1992). Crusaders, labeled "muckrakers" by Theodore Roosevelt, sought to reveal
misconduct in institutions and misbehavior by public figures in the early years of the
twentieth century. See id.; JAMESH.DYGERT, THE INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST:FOLKHEROES
OFANEWERAviii (1976). The 1920s brought back a wave of sensationalism in the press-so-
called "jazz journalism." At the time, say the Emerys, the press was "preoccupied... with
sex, crime, and entertainment, reflect[ing] the spirit of the times." EMERY & EMERY, supra,
at 265. The 1960s and 1970s brought back the same fervor for investigative reporting that
animated the muckrackers halfa century before, and with it, an active rebirth of criticism of
the media from within and without the press. See generally DYGERT, supra;EDWINDIAMOND,
GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS (1978).
2. In 1998, the California legislature passed a so-called anti-paparazzi statute. See CAL.
CIV. CODE §1708.8 (West 1999). Although the ostensible purpose of the law was to reduce the
risk that photographers would engage in harassment of and spying on the rich and famous
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a euphemism for aggressive and blatant prying that leaves no
institution or person safe from massive public exposure. The
intensity of the reportage about Monica Lewinsky's relationship
with President Clinton, Anita Hill's claim that she was sexually
harassed by (now) Justice Clarence Thomas, and 0. J. Simpson's
alleged murder of his former wife contributed to arguments about
the "dumbing down" of the press, its preference for lurid detail and
sensational footage over substance, and its lack of respect for
personal privacy.
Interestingly, however, much of the fight over the press in this
decade has revolved not so much around the content of its report-
age-is it fair, is it true, is it the public's business, is it injurious to
national security or the system of justice?-but rather, around the
methods used by the press to get its information. While dismay over
the content often hovers visibly in the background, the specific focus
more often is on the process of newsgathering rather than on the
news itself.
The emblematic case in this genre is the suit filed against ABC
by the Food Lion supermarket chain.' Food Lion did not contest the
truth of the allegations about its mishandling and misdating of
perishable foods, as reported by the news magazine PrimeTime
Live.4 Rather the entire attack was on the way the reporters went
about getting the material they aired: they concealed their identity
as journalists to get jobs with the supermarket chain, and they
documented their findings by videotaping what they saw with
hidden cameras.5 The "unfairness" of the techniques, not the
content of the story, was what allowed a jury to award the plaintiff
company some $1400 in compensatory damages and to assess
punitive damages against the defendant in excess of $5.5 million.6
Of course, the trial judge subsequently reduced the punitive
damages award to $315,000,' and, in the last quarter of 1999 the
Fourth Circuit further reduced Food Lion's total recovery to a mere
in the privacy of their homes, the vagaries of the language used in the law open the possibility
that a whole range of photographic and recordation activities will be illegal because they are
accomplished during something that can be defined by a court as a "trespass." See id. Similar
legislation was also introduced in Congress by Senators Boxer, Feinstein, and Hatch. See
Personal Privacy Protection Act, S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998).
3. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997),
rev'd in part and affd in part, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
4. See 984 F. Supp. at 927.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 940.
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two dollars.8 But the size of the original award, the years the case
took to litigate, and a steady drumbeat of other cases in which the
reporting methods of the press have been attacked as trespass,
fraud, violation of eavesdropping statutes, physical harassment,
theft of information, RICO claims, theft of images, violation of
wiretapping laws, violations of federal civil rights laws, violation of
copyright, and the theft of trade secrets have left many in the media
shaken and others convinced that the overly aggressive modern
press is finally getting its come-uppance. 9
Only hindsight will provide the wisdom and restore the dispassion
necessary to judge the claims and counterclaims in each of these
individual controversies fairly. But, while the dust is settling and
the controversies remain clearly in mind, it may be useful to try to
disaggregate the multiplicity of issues that are jumbled together
under a heading like "aggressive newsgathering" and to pick out a
few of them for individual examination. I focus my comments on a
theme that seems to recur over time in the cases and the commen-
tary about the news and how it is gathered-namely, the legitimacy
of subterfuge as a newsgathering technique.
Is it ever legitimate for investigative reporters to use the tools of
disguise and concealment? Is it fraud to pretend to be someone
other than a reporter to get a story? Is it trespass or theft or some
other tort-or even a crime-to supplement what the reporter can see
8. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1999).
9. See, e.g., 984 F. Supp. at 928. For a discussion of whether ABC employees'
misrepresentations about their identity provided for a fraud claim, see id. at 929. But see 194
F.3d at 513, 514 (fraud claim fails because not proximate cause of injury to plaintiff). For a
discussion of whether ABC employees' entrance under false pretenses constituted trespass,
see id. at 518. See also Medical Lab. Management Consultants v. American Broad. Cos., No.
Civ-95-2494-PHX-ROS, 1997 WL 405908, at *2-4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27,1997) (discussing whether
secretrecordingsviolate federalwiretappinglaws); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 811,817 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (discussing whether RICO statute applied to Capital
Cities); New Kids On The Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540,1543-44 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (discussing whether the use of information from a singing group's pay telephone
number in a news article was copyright infringement); Boddie v. American Broad. Cos., 694
F. Supp. 1304, 1309-10 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (discussing if a violation of federal wiretapping
statutes is also a violation of federal civil rights); United States v. Morrison, 604 F. Supp. 655,
663 (D. Md. 1985) (discussing whether release of classified photographs to a magazine is a
theft of information); Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 79 (Cal. 1999)
(concluding there is a theft ofimage tort for surreptitious video recording); Shulman v. Group
W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,491-92 (Cal. 1998) (discussing whether recording a conversation
in a public spot violated California's eavesdropping statutes); Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v.
Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 576-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
whether using a competitor's traffic information constituted use of a trade secret); State v.
Lee, 917 P.2d 159,164-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (discussingwhether aggressive reporting was
a form of physical harassment).
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or hear with tape recordings, videotapes, or still photographs if the
subject of the report is unaware of being recorded?
These are not new questions, and they are not driven in any but
the most insignificant ways by the advent of new technologies like
infrared cameras or ultrapowerful telephoto lenses."° They are not
cases about wiretapping or the use of devices to permit the press to
snoop on people in places where they reasonably believe they are
safe from prying ears and eyes." These disputes are not about the
ability of subjects to withdraw from sight into secluded places. 2
Rather, the genuinely intriguing cases are those where the subject
knows or could readily discover that other parties are present (often
parties who are not intimates like family and close friends), and
where what is captured is behavior in which the subject willingly
engages in the presence of others-that is, she has not been en-
trapped into acts in which she would ordinarily not participate.
These are situations in which the reporter assumes a false identity
or secretly records what she observes because she believes it is the
only way to uncover the truth, because she wants hard evidence to
back up her word, or, increasingly, because she needs sound and
images to illustrate her story for the audiovisual media.
Although the legal complaints against this kind of behavior take
a variety of forms, 3 what is at issue in all of them is a special kind
of privacy claim that is difficult to capture in a brief phrase. These
are cases where it would ordinarily be difficult for the plaintiff to
10. Miniaturization of standard recording devices, however, is a modification of older
technologies that permits reporters to record more easily without the awareness of their
subjects. See Tom Mashberg, Nowhere to Hide-In Today's High Tech Spy Game, It's Us
Against Us, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 22, 1998, at 1; see also Ken Ringle, Your Secret's Not Safe
With Spy Gadgets, AUSTINAMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 22, 1992, at F3. On the other hand,
secret recording with hidden microphones and cameras is not new. See, e.g., Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. The classic case of this type is Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239,242 (N.H. 1964),
in which the state supreme court recognized a cause of action against a landlord who
concealed a listening device in the bedroom of the house he rented to the plaintiffs.
12. Cases where the party under observation is unaware of anyone watching or listening
and believes that he is in a private space are what I would characterize as call espionage
cases. The invisible eye or ear comes in an increasing variety offorms. For example, consider
the recent dispute over the use of the identification codes that were imbedded in the Intel
Pentium III chip and in Windows 98. The average user would not know that these identifiers
are there, but a person with a sufficient degree of computer sophistication could use the
numbers to put together an amazingly detailed profile of the computer user's activities. See,
e.g., Hiawatha Bray, Privacy Advocates Decry Digital 'Fingerprints' Step Up Call for Federal
Protection in Wake of Microsoft Disclosure, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1999, at C1. These cases
are legitimately troubling but beyond the scope of consideration in this article.
13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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argue that the press had no right to publish the information at
issue. It is generally of at least modest public significance, and
rarely, if ever, reveals the sort of genuinely intimate material that
a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity might be horrified to
have published." Nor can the subject complain that the story is
untrue and/or libelous. Rather, what the plaintiff argues, stripped
of detail, can be summarized as follows: this person (the reporter)
had no right to observe me and report on my doings-even if my
coworkers or friends or patients or customers could do so, and even
if those persons would be entirely within their rights to tell a
reporter what I did. 5 Or, conversely, the complaint might be that,
although the reporter was free to observe my conduct 6 (and could
freely report about it based on her recollections and notes), she was
not entitled to memorialize what she saw and heard with mechani-
cal recording devices unless she obtained my prior permission. In
other words, the argument is that the method of gathering the news,
and not its publication, is the legal wrong. Although this distinction
between information that is legally reported but illegally obtained
will strike many observers as intuitively correct and can quite
intelligibly be defended in certain situations, in a growing number
of recent court decisions, a clear rationale for the lines being drawn
is not easy to discern. This does not, of course, mean that cases are
being wrongly decided-they could simply be poorly justified. But at
the very least, this seems the right moment to take a step back,
think about where we are on these issues, and ask how we have
gotten there.
II. How THE IssuE GOT FRAMED
None of the techniques discussed in this article have been newly
invented by journalists at the end of the millennium. Although the
ethics of assuming a false identity (or at least of not revealing that
14. One might imagine, for example, that photographs ofnudity or sexual relations would
be in this category. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652 (1976); see also William B.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 396 (1960); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight:AFarewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELLL.REV. 291,299
(1983) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Farewell to Privacy Tort].
15. Almost never has an action for privacy been found when the plaintiff voluntarily
revealed the information in the presence of others. See, e.g., Virgil v. Sports illus., 424 F.
Supp. 1286, 1288 (S.D. Cal. 1976); Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 147 Cal.
Rptr. 59, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
16. These would be cases, for example, where the reporter observed something in a public
place, a place of public accommodation where the press was allowed to be, or where the
reporter disclosed her identity and the subject knowingly spoke with the reporter.
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the reporter is a reporter) have recently been a subject of debate in
the journalistic community,' 7 the technique is a venerable one.
Elizabeth Cochrane, more commonly known as Nelly Bly, pretended
to be a patient so she could write about conditions in mental
institutions in New York in the 1890s."8 Upton Sinclair gathered
the material for his novel, The Jungle, by going undercover and
obtaining a job in a meat packing plant. 9 The conditions he
uncovered led to the creation of the federal Food and Drug Adninis-
tration. ° Over the years, many journalists who assumed false
identities to get their stories have earned prestigious prizes,
including the Pulitzer.2'
Similarly, hidden recording devices are nothing new. A reporter
for the New York Daily News won notoriety (and a place in journal-
ism history) in the 1920s by sneaking a camera into Sing-Sing
prison to photograph an execution.22 In the 1960s and 1970s,
surreptitious filming brought to light such matters as the operation
of bookie parlors in St. Louis and judges who associated with
bookmakers and members of organized crime.23 I have found little
17. See, e.g., Gina Lubrano, Ethics and Information Gathering (Opinion), SAN DIEGO
UNION & TRiB., Feb. 3, 1997, at B7. Lubrano, who serves as her paper's reader
representative, argues that there is no ethical distinction between a reporter who fakes
interviews and one who hides his identity to obtain a job with a company and spy on its
activities. See id. In her view, it was clear that the reporters hired by Food Lion breached
their duty of good faith to their unsuspecting employer. See id. If they knew about the sale
of unfit food, their responsibility was to prevent its sale, not to report on it. See id.; see also
Steven Perry, Hidden Cameras, New Technology, and the Law, COMM. LAW., Fall 1996, at 1,
21 (describing the controversy); Susan Paterno, The Lying Game, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May
1997, at 40, 42 (same and discussing guidelines issued by the Society of Professional
Journalists).
18. See Louis FILLER, MUCKRAKING AND PROGRESSmSM IN THE AMERICAN TRADITION 234
(1996).
19. See WILLIAMA. BLOODWORTH, JR., UPTON SINCLAIR 45-48 (1977).
20. See id. at 57.
21. For example, in the 1970s, William Sherman of the New York Daily News won a
Pulitzer Prize, as well as the Polk and the Newspaper Guild awards, for posing as a patient
(in cooperation with government authorities) to expose Medicaid fraud. See DYGERT, supra
note 1, at 23-25. For additional examples of undercover reporting involving disguised identity,
see Kyle Neiderpruem, Food Lion Case May Punish Future Journalists: Undercover Only Way
to Get Some Stories, QUILL, May 1997, at 47. Neiderpruem points out that the technique was
used by a Consumer Reports staffer, Trudy Lieberman, to check on nursing homes. See id.
Ben Bagdikian spent a week as a prisoner to report on conditions inside the jail. See id. An
Asbury Park paper sent two teams of journalists, black and white, to report on housing
discrimination. See id. Neiderpruem argues that many important stories could not be
covered if the press were discouraged from going undercover. See id.
22. See EMERY & EMERY, supra note 1, at 283.
23. See DYGERT, supra note 1, at 166-67.
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evidence, however, that these practices caused the press much in
the way of legal difficulties up until 1971.
It is true, however, that technological means of seeing, hearing,
and memorializing have long been treated with suspicion and have
a venerable history of regulation in a number of arenas. Many
states and the federal government have laws on the books, for
instance, criminalizing unauthorized wiretapping; as will be
discussed further below, the main objective seemed to be to
discourage private snoops who were not parties to the discussion
and whose presence could not readily be detected.
In general, the visual and aural technologies behind television and
radio have been subject to a variety of regulations that go well
beyond what was necessary to allocate frequencies on the air waves.
Concern about the power and influence of media using sight and
sound and fears about their impact on children, have led periodi-
cally to efforts to regulate the content of the programming.24
Historically, the use of cameras and broadcasting equipment has
also been disfavored in certain settings, such as in courts. Although
reporters were allowed to attend trials and even sketch parties as
they testified, in the aftermath of the Lindbergh kidnapping trial in
the 1930s and the notorious trial of Dr. Sam Shephard in the 1950s,
photography, recordation, and broadcasting equipment were barred
from the courts of most states and of the federal government, a
situation that did not begin to reverse itself until twenty years ago.25
The objections to the use of recording devices were not based solely
on such concerns as whether cameras were too noisy and distract-
ing; a variety of other claims, including the fear that televising
sensational trials would have an adverse impact on public morals,
were put forward.26
Virtually the only injunction against a piece of reportage that
withstoodjudicial review was issued against a filmmaker, Frederick
24. See, e.g., FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECHVS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING (1975); see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
25. The history oftelevision and still cameras in courtrooms is given in Jack B. Weinstein
& Diane L. Zimmerman, Let the People Observe Their Courts, 61 JUDICATURE 156 (1977), and
Diane L. Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for
the Constitutional Protection of the News-gathering Process, 1980 DuKE L.J. 641, 678-81
(1980) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock]. For a current account of the
status of televising trials, see RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TVOR NOTTV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE AND
THE COURTS (1998), and Dolores K. Sloviter, If Courts are Open, Must Cameras Follow?, 26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 872 (1998).
26. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock, supra note 25, at 695.
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Wiseman, for his powerful documentary, Titicut Follies." The film,
virtually without dialogue, was said by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court to be a "massive, unrestrained invasion of the
intimate lives of these State patients ... in situations which would
be degrading to a person of normal mentality and sensitivity."" The
injunction, which permitted the movie to be shown to certain
professionals with prior approval of the court, was not lifted until
1991.29 It is not at all clear-in fact, I would deem it quite un-
likely-that a written report about the abysmal conditions in a state
facility for the criminally insane would have met with a similar
reaction. In some way, the camera changed the balance. °
Attention to the technology of newsgathering and particularized
concern with subterfuge merged two important cases in the 1970s.
The best known of these is Dietemann v. Time, Inc.31 InDietemann,
the plaintiff was practicing medicine without a license, a charge on
which he was subsequently convicted. He provided his services in
his house rather than in an office.32 When reporters for Life
Magazine armed themselves with hidden cameras and microphones
and posed as patients seeking treatment from Dietemann, they were
engaging in behavior that was common,3 even if not universally
approved by journalists.34
The Dietemann court was not willing to say that the reporters
were legally liable for failing to identify themselves honestly.
Instead, it struck out against their use of the recording equipment,
calling secret recording a form of invasion of privacy, an intrusion
into a physical space where the plaintiff had a reasonable expecta-
tion of solitudeY.3  The court reasoned that:
27. See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969).
28. Id. at 615.
29. See For the Record: Legal Newsbriefs, Massachusetts-"Follies" Can Be Shown, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 6 (reporting dissolution of 20-year-old ban on public exhibition of film).
30. One obvious issue in the case was that individuals were photographed so that they
could be recognized easily by anyone who knew them. Although there is no general right not
to be photographed, arguments were made about the lack of competence of several subjects
to consent and to the shockingly intimate quality of the subject matter - inmates crouched
nude along walls and a dying man being force-fed. See Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 613, 615.
31. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
32. See id. at 245-46.
33. See id. at 246.
34. See DYGERT, supra note 1, at 153; see also SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS,
CODE OF ETHICS, in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 196, 199-201 (Rena A. Garlin
ed., 1999).
35. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 248.
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One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor
may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and
observes when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to take
the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or
recording, or in our modem world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public
at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select. A different rule
could have a most pernicious effect upon the dignity of man and it would
surely lead to guarded conversations and conduct where candor is most
valued, e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.
36
Although intrusion was a recognized subdivision of the tort of
invasion of privacy,37 it was not at the time a highly developed
branch of the law. Intrusion up to then had been used almost
entirely to deal with situations where the intruder was an unantici-
pated and invisible presence, but one who had not committed a
traditional trespass-for example, a landlord who bugged a tenant's
bedroom.38 What was surprising about the Dietemann holding was
that this "intruder" had been invited in by the plaintiff and was, by
the court's own admission, free to report to the public about the
plaintiffs healing methods. 9 Perhaps even more surprising was the
fact that the court's solicitousness had been called forth on behalf of
a plaintiff who was not entrapped into engaging in illegal activity
but who rather engaged of his own volition in the illegal practice of
medicine on a regular basis.40
The second case, decided seven years later in New York, did not
involve subterfuge, but it did make clear that newsgathering
techniques could become a source of liability even in rather public
places.4" In that instance, a television crew arrived, with cameras
rolling, to photograph the inside of a famous French restaurant that
had just been cited for health code violations." Although the
reporter and crew left the premises when requested to do so, the
court ruled that their presence in a place of public accommodation
36. Id. at 249.
37. In 1960, William Prosser wrote a law review article that reviewed all privacy tort
cases decided up to that time; he concluded that they really broke down into four separate
causes of action, one of which was the tort of intrusion. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 389. The
quadripartite scheme was then adopted by the American Law Institute in its Restatement
(Second) of Torts and has been widely adopted by state courts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 652B (1976).
38. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (N.H. 1964).
39. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
40. See id. at 246.
41. See Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978).
42. See id. at 816.
11932000]
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was a tort-not intrusion, but a physical trespass.43 The court never
stated this directly, but the discussion in the case strongly suggests
that the outcome was influenced by the defendant's use of television
cameras." But, unlike Dietemann, the New York court did not focus
on the equipment. Instead, the basis of liability was the physical
presence of the reporters themselves.45 The court concluded that
the reporter and camera crew committed a trespass merely by
entering the restaurant because they had come there to get a story
rather than a lunch.46
As did Dietemann, the Le Mistral case suggested that a court so
inclined could easily wrench apart the newsgathering of the press
from the information that was gathered by them, characterize the
techniques as tortious conduct, and have a basis for awarding
damages against the press-all the while "steering clear" of the
limitations on direct regulation of speech imposed by the First
Amendment. The underlying normative system was one that,
however labeled, recognized a fairly broad physical arena of
"privacy" within which the plaintiff could exercise considerable, if
not total, control over when and how journalists, as opposed to
"ordinary" people, could observe him.
Kicking around under Dietemann andLe Mistral were some quite
serious questions about the relationship between newsgathering
conduct and the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. It would be difficult to entertain the suggestion for even a
moment that journalists, in the interest of getting their story, are
protected by the Constitution against civil or criminal liability for
43. See id. at 817. The trespass rationale in Le Mistral is an odd one. Places of public
accommodation carry with them an implied invitation to enter. The invitation can, of course,
be withdrawn, but the normal expectation is that the unwelcome visitor will withdraw, not
that she will be liable for damages simply for incurring the displeasure of the owner. It is
hard to imagine that a passerby who stopped to ask to use a telephone or a restroom would
have similarly been subjected to a successful trespass claim.
44. That some sort of privacy concern was an issue in Le Mistral is clear from the opinion.
The court noted that the cameras caused a stir among the patrons:
Patrons waiting to be seated left the restaurant. Others who had finished eating,
left without waiting for their checks. Still others hid their faces behind napkins
or table cloths or hid themselves beneath tables. (The reluctance of the plaintiffs
clientele to be video taped was never explained, and need not be. Patronizing a
restaurant does not carry with it an obligation to appear on television.)
Id. at 816 n.1. Clearly, the patrons were quite visible to one another and the court does not
suggest that, had another diner chosen to reveal to the world who was lunching at Le
Mistral that day, the patrons would have had cause to complain; the problem seems to have
been the press getting the information directly.




anything they do in the process of reporting. A reporter may not
commit an assault or break into a house simply because doing so
would enable her to acquire information that would otherwise be
unavailable. Reporters are subject to the same laws as the rest of
us. But the behavior in these two cases cannot so easily be charac-
terized as wrongdoing. Going undercover or showing up with
camera rolling might be offensive and irritating, but was it the sort
of clearly recognized bad act for which any citizen should expect to
answer in a court of law?47 This was not clear. What was clear,
however, was that courts could, if they chose, nudge the line
between wrongdoing and permissible behavior significantly enough
to the left or right to catch in the net of the tort system a variety of
newsgathering practices that historically had aided the press in
acquisition of publishable information."
This raised interesting issues. Were the subtle and not so subtle
adjustments in the tort law ones explicable and justifiable on wholly
neutral grounds? Or were they really indirect attempts to regulate
the press? As the Supreme Court gradually cut off direct ways to
attack the content of press reports by announcing a set of First
Amendment privileges, would redefined or new torts-facially
applicable to one and all, but as a practical matter most likely to be
used only against the press-become the indirect but effective
alternative route to content control? These uses of tort law clearly
impacted on First Amendment activity. But neither the Dietemann
nor the Le Mistral courts accepted the argument that indirect
impediments to reportage were constitutionally significant.49
At the time, there was virtually no guidance from either the
Supreme Court or the highest state courts about where protection
47. Some commentators have concluded that the answer to this question is
unambiguously "yes." See, e.g., John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of
Sin:The Constitutionality of ConsequentialDamages forPublication ofIll-GottenInformation,
4 WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 1111 (1996). Walsh and his co-authors argue that the press
should be liable not only for their tortious acts during newsgathering but for consequential
damages that flow from the ensuing publication. See id. at 1112.
48. This point was made by Professor Paul LeBel in a recent article. He wrote:
Stating that an act committed while newsgathering is a legal wrong-and is
therefore afforded no constitutional protection-ignores the extent to which
the initial characterization of the act as a wrong begs the ultimate question.
What constitutes wrongdoing, whether tortious or criminal in nature, is a
function of positive common and statutory law with a constitutional overlay.
Paul A- LeBel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment
Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
1145, 1148 (1996).
49. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971); Le Mistral, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 817.
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under the Bill of Rights left off and the civil and criminal system
could properly take over. Or, to put it differently, whether news-
gathering was in any sense a protected activity was a question that
was up for grabs. In 1972, between Dietemann and Le Mistral, the
Supreme Court took one cut at the problem of protecting news-
gathering but did not clarify the situation very much. InBranzburg
v. Hayes,5" the Court reviewed several cases in which reporters were
called to testify before grand juries about alleged criminal activities
they had witnessed.5' The reporters resisted appearing, arguing
that their ability to gather news would be damaged if they were
required to reveal the identity of their sources or other confidential
material in a criminal proceeding.52 The Court was deeply divided
on the issue; four Justices dissented,53 and Justice Powell, although
he voted with the majority, expressed the view that the state could
only call journalists to testify in good faith and for good cause
because to do otherwise would risk turning the press into an arm of
the state.54 Even among the majority, no one was entirely willing to
place newsgathering entirely outside the framework of the Constitu-
tion.55 In an oft-quoted line, the Court said, "without some protec-
tion for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated,"56 but it left blank what might be encompassed by "some
protection."
The blank has not been filled in the years since Branzburg. The
Court has, however, stated repeatedly both that the press is not
entitled to First Amendment privileges denied the ordinary citizen,
and that it must abide to the same laws that apply to others. The
most dramatic example of this equality principle in operation can be
found in the Court's 1991 decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.57
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. See id. at 672-79.
52. See id.
53. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart.
54. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 681.
56. Id. An important previous case in the same genre is Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980) (per curiam). In Snepp, the Court summarily approved the imposition of a
constructive trust on all the profits from a book that had been published in violation of a
government contract requiring that the manuscript be submitted for security preclearance.
See id. at 508. The government complained only of the breach of contract; it did not allege
that the author, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, revealed any classified
information in the book. See id. at 508-09.
57. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). Writing for a five-person majority, Justice White said that
"generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." Id. at 669.
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Shortly before an election, a source, in return for an oral promise of
confidentiality, gave reporters information about the arrest record
of a Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor of Minnesota. 8
The arrests turned out to be fairly trivial, and when editors from
some of the publications realized that Cohen, who was leaking this
damaging information, was an agent of the opposing candidate, they
decided to ignore the promise and publish the full story.59 The
Supreme Court ruled that the source was not barred by the First
Amendment from recovering under state law on a promissory
estoppel theory even if, as the majority conceded, the result is an
"incidental" burden on the press's newsgathering ability.6 °
The vacant territory left by Branzburg and the tough tenor of
Cohen have undoubtedly made it easier for plaintiffs to make
aggressive uses of the models provided by Dietemann and Le
Mistral. If a dispute with the press can be characterized as a
violation of laws of general applicability, plaintiffs have a greater
chance of convincing courts to use the conduct as a basis of
liability-even when, one suspects, the underlying discontent is more
about content than it is about conduct. Certainly, there has been a
burgeoning number of "conduct" litigations, of which the Food Lion
case is the most prominent representative, and I can think of no
other explanation for this clustering. History simply does not
support the alternate hypothesis that the modern press has
suddenly and unexpectedly changed to become for the first time ever
either lawless or, at the very least, heedless of the rights of others.6'
IlI. THE APPLICATION OF "SPEECH-NEUTRAL" RULES OF GENERAL
APPLICABILITY TO NEWSGATHERING
Are the modern newsgathering tort cases legitimately a subject of
controversy and concern? Is it insufficient to say, now that the
Supreme Court has spoken in Cohen, that courts can do as they
please in this area? Is it not clear that the First Amendment is
simply not implicated by lawsuits against the press that do not
penalize the defendants for what they say, but rather for behavior
that would also be tortious if it were engaged in by a priest or an
58. See id. at 665.
59. See id. at 665-66.
60. See id. at 671-72. An interesting discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
this area can be found in Robert M. O'Neil, Tainted Sources: First Amendment Rights and
Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1005 (1996).
61. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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auto mechanic or a railroad conductor? The answer, I would
suggest, is not that simple.
First of all, it is not impossible that the courts, in applying tort
law, could choose, at least in limited ways, to distinguish the press
from ordinary members of the public on the ground that the press
has a role as a surrogate gatherer and disseminator of information
on behalf of the general public. 2 Nor does it seem out of the
question that the Supreme Court might eventually conclude that at
least some laws of "general applicability" demand a higher level of
scrutiny in their application to the press if blind adherence to the
neutrality principle in the context of newsgathering turns out to
prevent or substantially limit the quantity and quality of informa-
tion that can be made available to the public about matters of social
concern. Although they tipped in the opposite direction, Branzburg
and Cohen were cases on which the Court was deeply divided; it
would not, therefore, be at all surprising if, in the future, some
narrowing of Cohen and some further elucidation of Branzburg's
elusive language about a newsgathering privilege were to occur.
States, too, may be inclined to use their own constitutions to
elaborate protections for the newsgathering process, should it seem
necessary. This is not, however, the place to muse over the
desirability or scope of some new and separate newsgathering
privilege; I merely want to note that the matter has never been
conclusively resolved and, furthermore, that the newsgathering
cases of the past decade challenge easy assumptions about the
clarity of the divide between content and process in applying the
First Amendment."
Second, it is important to remember that Cohen simply says that
the press can be subjected to the same laws that apply to the public
at large.64 It does not hold that restrictions may be imposed on the
conduct of the press that state and federal courts might hesitate to
apply to ordinary members of the public. Thus, if hiding one's
identity or secretly recording what one obviously and openly can see
62. The late Chief Justice Warren Burger described the press as "surrogates for the
public" in his opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980), a
case announcing a First Amendment right of access to court proceedings. See also Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
63. Some scholarly thinking about this subject has already been done. See Steven Helle,
The News-gathering]Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1
(1982); LeBel, supra note 48; see also Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock, supra note 25
(positing a constitutional protection for newsgathering that would allow use of cameras and
other recording devices at trials and other open government proceedings).
64. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70.
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and hear is a tort for a reporter, we need to agree that it would also
be a tort were the same action to be performed by a next-door
neighbor. In other words, these cases need to rest on intelligible
and generalizable policy grounds. Interestingly, however, when the
cases, the literature, and other pertinent sources of learning are
examined, surprisingly little can be found in them that actually tries
to set out a neutral, normative basis for finding these activities
tortious. Let me clarify. The cases and the literature do reveal that,
to many, undercover tactics, when used by the press, are extremely
distasteful. That attitude is not difficult to understand in some
regards. I would be the first to admit that the very thought that
someone might unsuspectedly be recording what I assume is an
"ordinary" conversation with an intent to publish it to the world at
large gives me pause. It feels like a violation of my privacy; it bears
the sting of existence in an Orwellian world of omniscient watchers.
But the question that ought to be addressed is whether the strong
psychological or emotional reaction that I clearly share with many
others is a sound basis for legal restraint. Distaste, after all, is not
the necessary equivalent of legally cognizable harm.
The first thing that stops me from immediately leaping to the
conclusion that the conduct of the undercover reporter is ipso facto
a wrong, is the enormous complexity and inconsistency of human
attitudes (my own included) regarding expectations of privacy. I
think it is safe to say that all of our opinions about the value of
privacy are highly contingent. A few examples may help explain
what I mean.
As anyone who has not been rivaling Rip Van Winkle in marathon
unconsciousness of late is aware, the public has been the recipient
of volumes of highly explicit transcripts of telephone calls, video-
taped testimony, and other forms of evidence relating to the sexual
relationship between a young White House intern and a President
of the United States. I doubt that the quantity and quality of
intimate revelation has evek been rivaled and much of the reason
the material became public was a result of decisions by special
prosecutor Kenneth Starr. I was, however, party to a conversation
with Mr. Starr about privacy several years ago while he was still a
federal appellate judge. In the course of this conversation, Judge
Starr admonished me for my skepticism about the viability of
offering legal protections against publishing information that
plaintiffs want to keep private. What decent person, he queried,
would be willing to run for public office if he could not assure that
no detail of his private life would remain undisclosed? (The example
he had in mind was the experience of his colleague on the appellate
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bench, Robert Bork. Judge Bork's video rental habits and even his
garbage were sorted through and reported on by the press during
his confirmation hearings for United States Supreme Court.)
To use a second example, police in several communities around
the United States have reportedly positioned cameras on city streets
to conduct video surveillance of the public as they go about their
daily business.65 The city of Tacoma, Washington, started using
these cameras in 1993, and a while later, the city of Baltimore
installed them over a sixteen block corridor in the downtown area.66
The police view the cameras as important crime fighting equipment.
It is unlikely that most people are aware they are being watched,
and one might have supposed, would be upset to know their every
gesture was being recorded. But civil libertarians have apparently
found it a challenge to generate significant concern among the
public about the potential of this practice to become a serious
governmental incursion into personal privacy.67
I have also observed that even when people clearly know better,
they frequently act in blithe disregard of their own privacy. Bill
Gates and his colleagues at Microsoft, who can scarcely be said to be
naive about the risks, used e-mail for numerous damaging commu-
nications about the company's desire to flatten its competitors. 68
And a group of Republican leaders in the House of Representatives
held sensitive discussions about former House Speaker Newt
Gingrich's possible responses to a House Ethics probe using a
cellular telephone, despite widespread knowledge of how readily
such calls could be intercepted by outsiders.69
In light of such inconsistencies, and because of the potential
impact on newsgathering, the rationality and moral force of
proscriptions against undercover reporting are at least worth some
examination and debate.
65. See Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 44.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 47.
68. See Steve Lohr, U.S. Presents Documents in CaseAgainst Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1999, at C16.
69. The facts are discussed in Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV.98-594 TFH, 1998 WL
436897, at *1 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998).
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A. Hidden and False Identities
The use of false identities (or failure to identify oneself as a
reporter) is a common theme in the newsgathering cases of the last
decade or so."° The award of compensatory and punitive damages
by the jury in the Food Lion case, to give one example, rested almost
entirely on the fact that Lynne Dale and Susan Barnett, two ABC
television producers, constructed false identities (complete with
false employment backgrounds and fake letters of reference) to get
themselves hired by the supermarket chain.7' Their use of hidden
cameras was obviously also offensive to the jury, but seems to have
been treated mostly as evidence that the pseudo-employees were
deficient in their duty of loyalty to Food Lion. The Fourth Circuit
ultimately reversed the damage award based on fraud because it
concluded that although the defendants acted knowingly and with
an intent to deceive, Food Lion could not show that it was injured by
the fraud.72 The jobs in question were at-will employment, subject
to termination by either side at any time; they were ones in which
employee turnover was generally high; and the reporters actually
performed their work as meat wrapper and deli clerk in a satisfac-
tory way while they were employed.73
But the fact that only two dollars in damages were left at the end
should not be read as a resounding victory for the press. In the first
place, had Food Lion been able to make a credible showing of harm
proximately caused byits reliance on the false identities constructed
bythe reporters (for example, if it had a reasonable expectation that
70. See, e.g., Desnickv. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (persons
posing as patients); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (involving a
plaintiff who is led to believe that members of a television crew are employees of district
attorney's office); Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (undercover
reporter gets work as telepsychic); Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402 (Minn.
1995) (involving a reporter who poses as a veterinary student); State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (involving a reporter who is prosecuted for impersonating a
public official).
71. The jury found that the television network and its employees had perpetrated a fraud
against the supermarket chain by "utilizing representations about prior, nonexistent work
experience," submitting them to obtain work for the two producers, and not revealing to Food
Lion that its new "employees" actually worked for ABC and were engaged in investigative
reporting. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13391, at
*5 (M.D.N.C. July 25, 1997); see also Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp.
923, 935-36 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (discussing relationship between fraudulent conduct and
punitive damages).
72. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1999).
73. See id. at 510-11.
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"employees" in this sort of job would not leave after only a few
weeks), the court would have been quite willing, as far as I can tell,
to treat concealment of a reporter's identify as fraud. Furthermore,
ABC was found liable to Food Lion for its undercover activities. The
appellate court said that by entering "areas of the store that were
not open to the public" and videotaping there, the reporters
breached their duty of loyalty to Food Lion, thereby converting their
status from that of invitees to that of trespassers.' Because Dale
and Barnett would not have been able to get into nonpublic areas of
the store had they not hidden the fact that they were reporters, it
seems as if their decision to conceal their identities was a critical
factor in finding liability for breach of loyalty as well.75 As a result,
the victory won by ABC may well turn out in the long run to be
somewhat Pyrrhic for the press, leaving open, as it does, consider-
able room to argue in future cases that not owning up to being a
reporter can give rise to tort liability. Because the breach of the
duty of loyalty, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, seems inherent
in this type of situation, future plaintiffs will probably pay more
attention to it as a viable case of action. Food Lion made what is
clearly in retrospect an error of judgment by seeking only nominal
damages for the breach of loyalty and for trespass, but subsequent
plaintiffs will no doubt be more aggressive.
The notoriety surrounding the Food Lion litigation and the Court
of Appeals's guarded language in its partial reversal could encour-
age future courts to conclude that members of the press who go
under cover to gather information are engaging in conduct that is
74. Id. at 519.
75. The court wrote that the interests of ABC and of Food Lion were opposed in "a
fundamental way" because ABC wanted to expose unsanitary practices in food handling and
deceptive packaging, while (presumably) Food Lion preferred to have these activities remain
unknown to the public. Id. at 516. Hence, an ABC employee who exposes wrongdoing while
under cover as an employee of the putative miscreant would seem, under the court's
reasoning, ipso facto to be engaging in tortious conduct. Although the court tried to keep the
holding narrow by emphasizing that the truly problematic aspect of the reporters' behavior
was their videotaping in parts of the store not open to the general public, the effort is unlikely
to be successful. Many places of business have no areas open to the public at large so that,
if one were to adopt this line of thought, any activities of an undercover investigative
reporter/employee would be open to challenge. Furthermore, the court made no effort to
explain why it picked out videotaping, as opposed to observing and reporting based on notes
and memory, as the egregious behavior that turned the reporters into tortfeasors. As a
rational matter, either form of encoding and reporting the information would cause the
interests of the news operation and the plaintiff to be in opposition. A court, therefore, that
wants to rule against a reporter for assuming a false or misleading identity, would find much
in the Fourth Circuit's opinion to support its view, whether or not videotaping had also




per se tortious. It would be unfortunate if this sort of reductionistic
approach were to be followed. Although there are circumstances
where the use of false identities probably should, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances, subject the press to liability, in many others it
would be hard to justify that result. The dividing line is not a
perfect one, but to me, the distinction between the tortious and the
nontortious makes sense only if it is drawn by attending to such
issues as power, authority, and the mantle of professionalism. Or
to put it differently, whose identity has been assumed and for what
purpose?
76
A source confronted by a reporter masquerading as someone like
a law enforcement official may feel that he has a duty or even that
he has no choice except to cooperate in providing information he
would otherwise be reluctant to share. A case decided in New
Jersey some years ago is a perfect example.77 A reporter pretending
to be "someone from the morgue" went to interview the mother of a
homicide victim.78 The reporter got the distraught intervi ewee to
give her a considerable amount of information about the deceased,
but was subsequently prosecuted for impersonating a public
official. 79  The court rejected an attempted First Amendment
defense, noting that the reporter's sole purpose in assuming the
guise of an official was "to induce another to submit to her pre-
tended official authority."8" Similarly, a reporter who assumes the
identity of a healthcare professional or an attorney could use that
assumed position to gain access to information that an actual
professional would be required to treat as a confidence. This, too,
distorts the relationship between reporter and source by allowing
76. Although many readers would, at this point, also add a distinction relating to
place-asserting that subterfuge cannot be used to gain access to private dwellings-
circumstances may exist where treating a private house or apartment as off-limits seems
unduly artificial. Although courts tend to be protective of people's right to be free of
intrusions in their dwellings, see, e.g., Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 526 N.W.2d
402, 402 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (reporter sued for failing to reveal her identity when she
accompanied veterinarian to plaintiffs' home); Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (reporters entered plaintiffs home as apparent members
ofparamedical team), the appropriate outcome may well depend upon what is going on in the
private dwelling. It might, for example, be used as the operational center of an illegal
gambling or drug ring. In Dietemann, the plaintiff conducted his unlicensed practice of
medicine from his house. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 245-46 (9th Cir. 1971).
Thus, bright line rules about deception that turn on the location to which the reporter gains
access may not always be satisfactory.
77. See State v. Cantor, 534 A.2d 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
78. See id. at 84.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 86.
2000] 1203
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1185
the reporter the benefit of a false mantle of authority.8 Although
these abuses are most likely to arise in the context of press cover-
age, it would make sense to sanction them as well, when engaged in
by private investigators or the merely nosy."2 Finally, a type of
abusive "authority" can sometimes be exercised in the guise of some
intimate relationship. One might, therefore, also remain concerned
about information that is gained by conniving, solely or largely for
the purposes of investigation, to achieve the position of a lover or
other intimate relation.
But when a reporter does not try to assume additional authority
or an unusual degree of intimacy by means of her "constructed"
persona, the case for finding that going undercover violates a law of
general applicability is harder to make out. Interestingly, although
the Ninth Circuit in decidingDietemann a quarter century ago made
no bones about its disapproval of surreptitious recording, it did not
react similarly to the fact that the reporters had obtained access to
the plaintiffs home by misidentifying themselves.83 Similarly, in
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos.,84 Chief Judge Posner,
writing for the Seventh Circuit, refused to allow a plaintiff to sue
the press for trespass or invasion of privacy on the ground that the
reporters gained access to the plaintiffs offices by pretending to be
patients."5 Of course, in neither case was the venue fully private.
Thus, one could assume that the expectation of seclusion held by a
reasonable plaintiff under such circumstances is qualitatively
different from that which would pertain at one's kitchen breakfast
table or in ope's bedroom alone or with family or intimate acquain-
tances. In both cases, the plaintiffs were making a place and
services available to members of the public, and the reporters did no
more than to avail themselves of experiences that were similar to
those accessible to a wide range of other people.
81. Something like this reasoning might satisfactorily explain the outcome in Miller v.
National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Miller, the reporters,'
without identifying themselves, entered the plaintiff's home with the paramedics when her
husband suffered a heart attack. See id. at 670.
82. One of the earliest privacy cases was an example of nosiness. See De May v. Roberts,
9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). The case arose when a person curious to see a human birth
convinced a doctor friend to let him come along on his next delivery. See id. at 146. The
patient was horrified when she discovered that the second man in her room was not the
medical assistant he was represented to be, and she sued. See id.
83. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). See also supra note
31 and accompanying text.
84. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
85. See id. at 1352-53.
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This does not mean, of course, that it would be impossible to find,
as the Food Lion court intimated, that obtaining access to a quasi-
public area under false pretenses is a kind of tortious invasion of
privacy.86 But why did neither Dietemann nor Desnick do so? The
two courts answered that question in different ways. The Ninth
Circuit almost seemed to treat the false identity issue as a form of
harmless error.8" The court recognized that Dietemann had no legal
protection under tort law against the possibility that any patient he
treated might decide to reveal publicly the details of the therapy. 8
Hence, it did not view the reporters as posing a risk to Dietemann
different in kind from that posed by anyone he might see in
treatment.8 9 Also, it was clear that the reporters did not entrap
Dietemann by inducing him to engage in conduct that he would not
have entered into on his own." Under the circumstances, the Ninth
Circuit seemed unconvinced that a mistake about the true identity
of the patient was significant enough to warrant a tort remedy.
Chief Judge Posner, in typical fashion, addressed the question in
some detail and honed in immediately on the nub of the problem.
In Desnick, the undercover reporters disclosed questionable
practices at a chain of eye clinics that performed thousands of
cataract operations on the elderly each year.9' The court concluded
that finding an undercover reporter liable for pretending to be a
patient at the clinics would serve none of the privacy-related
interests that torts like trespass and intrusion are meant to
support.92 The reporters did not eavesdrop on the unwary or invade
the plaintiffs' personal lives or intimate relations. 9 Rather, they
used subterfuge to find out about the clinics' operations and its
diagnostic procedures-things that clinic personnel displayed freely
86. The Fourth Circuit's entire holding on breach ofthe duty ofloyalty seemed to turn on
the fact that the reporters gathered information for ABC in nonpublic areas of the store,
suggesting at least implicitly that a privacy interest had been invaded. See Food Lion, Inc.
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). The court did, however, indicate
that it had sympathy for the reasoning infDesnick, and indicated that it did not believe that
in all cases, use of a false identity or other misrepresentation ought to be tortious. See id. at
517-18.
87. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 246.
88. The publication of private facts requires a revelation that would be offensive to
persons of ordinary sensitivity; I have never encountered a case with facts comparable to this
one in which a plaintiff prevailed on a private facts theory.
89. See id. at 249.
90. See id.
91. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1347-48.
92. See id. at 1352-53.
93. See id. at 1353.
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in front of real patients.94 If the use of undisclosed or false identities
was per se wrongful as a form of fraud, then, he pointed out, we
would have to be willing to allow restaurants to sue restaurant
critics (who frequently dine out undercover) for trespass, landlords
to sue fair housing testers, and stores to sue browsers who have, as
it turns out, no real intention to buy.95
The complicating fact is that however many silly examples of
shock and schlock journalism to which critics can point, society as
a whole often gains great value from learning things that only
undercover work is likely to reveal. In 1999, as courts, legal
commentators, and journalists fuss about the legality and ethics of
self-misidentification in newsgathering, I came across a review of a
television news show in which a reporter took ajob in a private for-
profit mental hospital and catalogued a veritable inferno of
abuses-gross mistreatment of patients (in some cases, leading to
their death), possible financial wrongdoing, and other serious
faults.96 When the evidence of the abuses was presented to federal
authorities and accreditation agencies, they agreed to take action -
admitting, however, that without the report, they would have been
unaware of the abuses.9 The result has been action by the federal
government against several hospitals in the chain;9  accrediting
agencies, too, have now begun to reexamine the hospitals.
Whether or not some stories that are acquired by means of
disguised identities could be gotten in other ways, it seems likely
that at least some significant percentage of them would not be
discoverable by anyone who admits to being an outside observer.99
Simply put, people do not always tell the truth when they are asked
about their activities, and important things that happen behind
closed doors can be hard to understand or to verify.
Realtors and landlords do not admit to race discrimination; only
the use of testers is likely to tell us whether it is really true that
only whites can buy or rent in particular neighborhoods. If Upton
Sinclair had not gone to work in the'meat-packing houses of Chicago
under an assumed identity, the need for a federal Food and Drug
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1351.
96. See Walter Goodman, Restraint as aEuphemism in PsychiatricHospitals, N.Y.TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1999, at E8.
97. See id.
98. See id.




Administration might have taken far longer to recognize. And even
when people act in the best of faith, the efficacy of their practices
can sometimes only be evaluated by the presence of "spies." In a
famous psychiatric study, David Rosenhan arranged to have eight
psychiatrically healthy persons pose as mentally-ill individuals to
gain admission to twelve different hospitals. °0 Despite the fact
that, upon admission, the testers behaved in a perfectly normal way,
none were detected by the medical staff as being "fakes."'0 ' In fact,
they averaged nineteen days per hospitalization before being
deemed well enough for release.' 2
Not all uses of assumed identities, of course, can be justified as
attempts to get at the truth that others prefer to hide or to serve
some other purpose. At least one example of a "media" outlet that
made use of disguised identity is, under the circumstances, pretty
amusing. A reporter for the Los Angeles Times wrote that, during
the Food Lion litigation, he received numerous faxes about the case,
filled with background information and recounting the substance of
the testimony by various witnesses.0 3 The faxes were identified as
coming from something called the "Media Hotline."'0° When the
reporter decided to find out what Media Hotline was, he discovered
it was actually Food Lion.'
To the extent that, as a society, we do not wish to condemn
undercover exercises of this kind across the board, but, rather, view
many of them as having a valid, and sometimes even a valiant,
purpose, the finding that using assumed identifies to go undercover
is potentially tortious, in the absence of some highly unusual factor,
should be undertaken with great care. Certainly there will be
circumstances where failure to identify oneself accurately should be
treated as a wrongful behavior, but courts should be careful as they
reach out to remedy occasional discrete abuses that the rules they
evolve do not turn out to be de facto proscriptions against
newsgathering. Purportedly, general rules that in practice and
intent rarely affect anyone but the press do not, I believe, fairly
meet the standard set by the Supreme Court in Cohen.
100. See David Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 251 (1973).
101. See id. at 252.
102. See id.
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B. Surreptitious Recording
In a number of cases, starting with Dietemann and culminating
with the recent Fourth Circuit ruling in Food Lion, courts have also
shown severe disapproval of another investigative reporting
technique; namely, the use of cameras and tape recorders (often
miniaturized and concealed) to back up or supplement the reporter's
eyes and ears. In most instances, the material recorded was not in
any ordinary sense secret or deeply personal, at least raising the
question, why is the fact of recording itself something that converts
acceptable behavior into a tortious, or even a criminal act? I have
puzzled over this question for a long time, and although I still have
no answer to the question, and cannot always square my instincts
with my reason, here is at least an effort to explore what is going on,
and why.
For decades, the classic equipment of a reporter was a notebook
and a typewriter. Usually, the reporter would take notes while the
source spoke in an interview, at a press conference, or on the scene
of a breaking news event. If time pressures or the objections of the
source prevented simultaneous note-taking, notes might be
scribbled down or typed up at the first opportunity after the fact,
while the reporter's memory of what was said and done was still
reasonably fresh. The notes would then be used as the building
blocks of the ultimate report. As technology became more sophisti-
cated, a reporter could use a tape recorder or a video camera, rather
than a pen or pencil, to take notes, enabling reporters to capture the
things they saw and heard more comprehensively and accurately
than they could with memory or pen. If one thinks of recording as
a form of note-taking, it is not at all obvious why one form is
increasingly treated as a tort, while the other is widely accepted as
appropriate-indeed, possibly protected by the First Amendment."°6
One might argue, plausibly, that note-taking, however it is done, is
106. Although there is very little directly on point, Justice Clark's opinion for the Court
inEstes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,539-40 (1965), seems to assume that takingnotes is ordinarily
a part of what is protected under the First Amendment. See also CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439
F. Supp. 862, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (finding no authority suggesting that press is not protected
by First Amendment in taking notes); Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland House of
Delegates, 310 A.2d 156, 160 (Md. 1973) (ban on note-taking unconstitutional because it
would "frustrate all effective communication). More recently, the Sixth Circuit implied that
note-taking by reporters was protected, concluding that a series of restrictions on the press
in covering a criminal trial were acceptable in part because note-taking was not prohibited.
See United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 410 (6th Cir. 1986).
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so intimately connected to the ability to speak and write that, unless
it is independently disruptive and is barred on that ground, the
press in fact ordinarily has a right to use cameras and tape
recorders in lieu of simultaneous or delayed hand writing ofnotes.' 7
Recording devices are also more than sophisticated note-taking
equipment. Their use can provide the press with content that can
be communicated directly to the public. This latter reason to use
recording devices further complicates the question of whether video
and audio recording ought to be treated as forms of speech activity
or instead as ancillary behaviors subject to laws of general applica-
bility. Logic is not stretched by distinguishing between content and
method when a reporter breaks into a house and then reports what
she has seen in it. But, if the behavior is using some sort of recorder
and if what is recorded is part of the content to be conveyed, it is not
obvious whether a tort rule or criminal statute that prohibits
recordation of something that can legally be heard or observed is a
neutral regulation of an action or a direct restriction on speech. The
problem is somewhat comparable to the one we would face if we
were to argue that the First Amendment protects paintings, but
that the state can enforce, as a law of general applicability, a
prohibition of the purchase and use of canvas, brushes, and
pigment. The method and the result do not segment so conveniently
into discrete parts.
Perhaps, in fairness, the problem is not the use of the technology
per se, but the fact that today, tape recording devices and cameras
are small enough to be concealed. As a result, a reporter can
memorialize what she sees or hears without the subject being aware
of it, even though the subject is aware of the presence of others,
including the person doing the recording. Most of the cases about
undercover news reporting have involved hidden cameras and tape
recorders, and one might posit that this is the distinction that
makes all the difference. People ought not to be photographed or
have their conversations taped if they do not know about it or have
not consented. But, again, life is not that simple. First of all, if the
issue is consent, the fact that the camera is hidden or obvious is not
107. Most of the discussion on this issue has taken place in the context of televising trials.
The primary, but not the exclusive, basis for restricting coverage in courtrooms has been the
problem of disruption caused by lights and large equipment. As television cameras have
grown smaller and more able to operate in ordinary lighting conditions, more and more states
have significantly loosened their proscriptions against televising trials. See Zimmerman,
OvercomingFuture Shock, supra note 25, at 673-84; see also GOLDFARB, supra note 25, at 75-
81, 175-88.
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an especially relevant consideration. Many prominent cases in
which unconsented photography was an issue-Le Mistral, for
example-involved cameras that were very obvious.' °8 But, the lack
of consent also does not provide an explanation for why recording is
a tort. People are often recorded or photographed without knowing
about it at the time, just as their activities may be observed as
reported on by more conventional, verbal means. But, at least
where this happens in a reasonably public setting, most courts have
been loath to say that the subject has a right to damages because he
did not know he was being observed or taped.109 What is visible to
the general public, except in highly unusual cases, is simply not
thought to evoke legal concern about privacy and may be memorial-
ized more or less at will-without requiring the prior consent of the
subject to do so."0
Alternatively, perhaps the problem really is that the settings in
which the recording takes place are not ones that cannot fairly be
described as "public." Again, the logic is not so obvious. In some
cases, recording might clearly invade privacy because it takes place
at a site to which the plaintiff has withdrawn (alone or with
intimates) with a reasonable expectation of hiding himself from
exposure. An uninvited snooper (or even someone who breaches the
trust that underlies a private moment by secretly recording it"')
108. See also Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832,836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979)
(reporters became trespassers when permission to film granted by one restaurant owner was
revoked the following day by the second); cf. Albertson v. TAK Communications, Inc., No. 89-
0052, 1989 WL 129270, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (unpublished table decision) (news reporter
carried visible camera but told subject the camera was not rolling).
109. See, e.g., Deteresa v. American Broad. &bs., 121 F.3d 460, 463-68 (9th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting a number of causes of action for secret videotaping and recording of plaintiff as she
stood in the doorway of her condominium); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
490 (Cal. 1998) (plaintiffs not entitled to object to photography at scene of accident); Aisenson
v. American Broad. Cos., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (surreptitious
videotaping of plaintiff in his driveway not actionable); Howell v. New York Post Co., 612
N.E.2d 699,705 (N.Y. 1993), affd in part, 619 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1993) (plaintiff had no cause
of action against photographer who used telephoto lens to take her picture on the grounds of
a hospital).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (1977). The most famous
exception is Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964). In Graham, a
woman whose skirt was blown up around her waist as she stepped out of a funhouse at a fair
was able to sue a newspaper that ran a photograph of this undisputedly "public" occurrence.
See id. at 474-75.
111. I have in mind as an example a lover who secretly records sexual activity and later
attempts to sell the video for public distribution. The proper line between those who fall into
this narrow category of "trust relationships" and those who do not may be difficult to
determine, and I do not attempt to do so here. Obviously, situations like this are uncommon,
but in recent years, cases somewhat on point have arisen regarding figure skater Tonya
Harding and television star Pamela Anderson Lee. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment
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may properly be said to invade some genuine interest in seclusion. 112
But the fact patterns in such successful cases as Dietemann, Food
Lion, Le Mistral, and Sanders are not of this kind. In each, the
location was a place of business, and what went on there was
something that, legally, could be described to the public by anyone
who witnessed it." 3 The plaintiff was fully aware of the presence of
people who owed neither an obvious legal nor moral duty to keep
confidential whatever they observed and experienced. Thus, no easy
answer exists to the question of why it is a legal wrong to record
that which would invade no protected interest if it were communi-
cated to others in some way other than by taping it." 4
How then can we explain the harm represented by recordation?
What is it that renders making an audio or a videotape different
from offering a verbal recounting? A number of courts now seem
Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Mary Schmich, Tonya Finally Lands that
XXXel, Cml. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1994, at 1.
112. See, e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490-91. Here, the court found some parts of the press
activity actionable because it invaded this narrow private sphere. See id. at 494. Reporters
attached a small microphone to the lapel of a nurse so that otherwise inaudible conversations
with an injured person could be recorded, and a press photographer took pictures of a victim
without her consent in an evacuation helicopter that was carrying her to the hospital. See
id. at 475. The court compared this behavior to invading a hospital room or jumping aboard
an ambulance without permission; it found that the plaintiffs had under such circumstances
a reasonable expectation of seclusion. See id. at 490.
113. The same was true in Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789,
795 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), a case permitting the owners of residential facilities for the
mentally retarded to recover for emotional distress caused by the secret videotaping in their
facilities that revealed instances of questionable care. In another recent instance in which
a court agreed that unconsented videotaping was wrongful, the plaintiff was an inmate in a
prison and was what filmed in a place where he could readily be seen by others. See Huskey
v. National Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Although a line might
plausibly be drawn at the door of a private dwelling occupied only by members of a family or
intimate friends, with rare exceptions, courts have been unwilling to recognize a legitimate
expectation of privacy for things that occur at social events, in the workplace, or even for
information that the plaintiff gives to others with the hope that it will not be shared. See,
e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976)
(involving plaintiffs bizarre behavior that occurred at parties and other semi-private
gatherings); Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67,71-73 (Cal. 1999) (recognizing that
conversations in a workplace that could be overheard might legitimately be repeated or
publicized without invading privacy); cf Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872,
884-85 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (finding that once plaintiff revealed fact of her sexual relations with
defendant to others, she had no expectation of privacy in that information). But see Rafferty
v. Hartford Courant Co., 416 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980) (refusing to grant
summary judgment to defendant who reported on events at large outdoor party).
114. Obviously, not everyone would agree that the wrongfulness of the behavior is hard
to understand. A cogent and highly critical article by Professor Andrew McClurg attacks the
use of hidden cameras and other forms of intrusive behavior by the press and does not express
any of the skepticism that pervades this author's thinking. See Andrew Jay McClurg,
Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public
Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989 (1995).
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convinced that such a difference does exist. Clearly, for example, it
mattered to the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion that secret video
recording had occurred. Nevertheless, the courts provide little in
the way of help in understanding why the practice should be
sanctioned. The two most fulsome attempts at explaining what is
wrong with recording are found in Dietemann and in Sanders v.
American Broadcasting Cos.,"' a recent decision from Supreme
Court of California, but neither is satisfying.
The explanation inDietemann seems to have two parts. First, the
court concluded that "hidden mechanical contrivances" are not
"'indispensable tools' of newsgathering," and therefore do not need
First Amendment protection.1 6 Second, the court reasoned that
permitting hidden cameras and tape recorders "could have a most
pernicious effect upon the dignity of man and it would surely lead
to guarded conversations and conduct where candor is most valued,
e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.""' The latter observation is
puzzling, to say the least,"18 and the former is not highly explana-
tory.
Sanders is permeated by a similarly obscure quality. In Sanders,
an employee of the Psychic Telemarketing Group sued when a
supposed fellow employee turned out to be a television reporter
working as a telepsychic to get an insider's perspective on the
phenomenon." 9 The reporter wore a video camera in her hat and
filmed what went on in the office. 2 ° The jury at trial awarded the
plaintiff compensatory damages of $335,000 and punitive damages
of $300,000.1 2 The intermediate appellate court reversed. 22 The
Supreme Court of California, however, reinstated the trial court's
result, concluding that an actionable intrusion into seclusion could
occur by virtue of secret videotaping, even though the plaintiff
115. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
116. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249(9th Cir. 1971).
117. Id.
118. Presumably, the policy of the law is to encourage patients and clients to be open and
honest with their physicians and lawyers, an objective that would not seem at risk when the
"patient" tapes the doctor or lawyer. The reverse-secret videotaping and publication by the
doctor or lawyer-would breach a right of confidentiality as well as the ethical obligation of
these professionals, suggesting that the facts of Dietemann posed no threat to the patient's
or client's interests.
119. See Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67. For those not familiar with the phenomenon,
telepsychics can be reached at a 900 number and give "readings" over the telephone for a "per-
minute" fee. See id. at 69.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 70-71.
122. See id.
1212
2000] NEWSGATHERER UNDER COVER 1213
occupied a cubicle in an open office and it would not have been a tort
to report, based on memory and, presumably, notes, what goes on in
such an establishment.
123
Why? Well, the court tells us it is because people like the plaintiff
have "a limited, but legitimate, expectation that their conversations
and other interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover
television reporters even though those conversations may not have
been completely private from the participant's coworkers." 24
Although the opinion then went on to line up the precedent that
supported its result and carefully distinguished away that which did
not, the entire thing has a rather ipse dixit quality.125 Where the
expectation comes from and why it is a legal wrong to disappoint is
not explained; all is assumed. 26
In another case, a judge argued that it is wrong to secretly record
because it deprives the speaker of the "'right to control the extent of
his own firsthand dissemination.", 27 Exactly what that right is and
where it originates is puzzling, since the common law of privacy has
severely limited the control plaintiffs have over dissemination of
information about themselves. 28
Another court found that the unconsented photography was
tortious because the subject matter-tattoos covering the torso of a
male prisoner-was private, despite the fact that such decoration
123. See id. at 73-74.
124. Id. at 69.
125. Id. at 71-73.
126. In that regard, the Sanders decision does not exist in isolation. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v.
Davis, 510 U.S. 1315,1318 (1994) (Blackmun, CircuitJustice) (lower courtfound surreptitious
videotaping to be tort; Justice Blackmun stayed preliminary injunction against airing the
film); Huskey v. National Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (N.D. Il. 1986) (prisoner in
exercise cage who is filmed without is permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy);
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 492 (Cal. 1998) (reversed grant of summary
judgment to defendant where accident victim's conversation with rescue team recorded);
Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that
secret videotaping of veterinarian on house-call violated homeowners' privacy and could be
legal grounds for trespass action).
127. Deteresa v. American Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d 460, 470 (9th Cir. 1997) (Whaley, D.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471,476
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980)). In another attempt at offering a rationale, an intermediate appellate
judge wrote that surreptitious videotaping of a person's facial features and expressions is a
violation of something that he called, rather unhelpfully, "autonomy privacy." Sanders v.
American Broad. Cos., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 600 (Ct. App. 1997) (Spencer, P.J., dissenting),
rev'd, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
128. See Zimmerman, Farewell to Privacy Tort, supra note 14, at 320-24, 344-47, 320-24,
344-47; see also, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (First Amendment requires
citizens to give up control over much of the information about themselves they might prefer
to keep private).
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would be readily visible to any observer under several circum-
stances, including on a public beach.'29
In Sanders, the dissenting judge of the appellate court, Presiding
Justice Spencer, tried to explain what the wrong was by arguing
that, "[w]hile plaintiff could not reasonably expect the information
... to be confidential and thus had no enforceable 'informational
privacy' interest, he may have retained an 'autonomy privacy'
interest."13 ° The term "autonomy privacy" is not common in the
parlance of privacy tort law, and what the judge meant by it was not
fully explicated. Justice Spencer went on to explain that the
plaintiff deserved to prevail because visual identification of the
plaintiff, with his facial expressions and gestures captured, "gave a
heft to defendants' broadcast that would otherwise have been
lacking" and caused the plaintiff greater distress.13' What he meant
by this is open to interpretation. Perhaps the objection was that the
recording made the report more believable than it otherwise would
have been, thereby increasing the plaintiffs embarrassment about
his job." 2 Perhaps it means that the film made what might have
seemed a frivolous story into a more important or weighty one. In
either case, the reasoning suggests a potential conflict with the First
Amendment because it seems motivated more by dissatisfaction
with the content rather than the methodology of newsgathering.
In another case, the court openly admitted that, in its view, the
defendant broadcasters might have had a defense to a tort action for
unwanted photography if the story they were pursuing had been of
greater moment, 3 3 presenting another example of a judgment that
seems to relate more to the content than the methodology of the
report.
The notion that some separate privacy right is implicated when
the capture of information comes from surreptitious recording
rather than from memory or notes is not, of course, a universally
129. See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1289.
130. Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599 (Spencer, P.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 600 (Spencer, P.J., dissenting).
132. Other judges have hinted, too, that the problem with surreptitious recording is that
it makes the reporter's account more believable and diminishes the plaintiffs ability to deny
the asserted facts. See Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 470. (Whaley, D.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). It is difficult to fathom a serious claim that the greater the credibility of
the report, the greater the legal wrong.
133. See Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1291 n.13.
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accepted truth. Courts remain quite divided on this issue.'34 The
Seventh Circuit, in a case where secret videotaping took place in an
eye clinic, concluded that, so long as no traditional right of privacy
was traduced,'35 the plaintiffs should have no remedy merely
because reporters taped what they were free to see and hear.
36
Even Sanders shows some concern over the potential breadth of the
principle it enunciates, stressing that the court did not intend to
create a per se rule against secret recording.'37
Furthermore, state and federal wiretapping laws, which
criminalize some forms of secret recording, do not take anything like
a uniform position against such activities. Although an exact count
is difficult, 3 ' it seems that there are about three times as many
134. Several courts have refused to recognize a tort for surreptitious recording. See
Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 467-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (secret recording of interview not a tort); Desnick
v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1995) (reporters who pose as
patients and record practices in eye clinics not liable for fraud or invasion of privacy);
Aisenson v. American Broad. Cos., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 387-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(surreptitious filming ofplaintiffin public place is not tortious); Howell v. New York Post Co.,
612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1993) (use of telephoto lens to photograph patient on hospital
grounds not tortious).
135. Chief Judge Posner ran through things that might have been problematic had they
been present:
No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life were publicized .... There
was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers recorded their own
conversations with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians. There was no violation
of the doctor-patient privilege. There was no theft, orintent to steal, trade secrets;
no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet .... Had the testers been undercover
FBI agents, there would have been no violation of the Fourth Amendment,
because there would have been no invasion of a legally protected interest in
property or privacy.
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.
136. Somewhat comparable reasoning can be found in Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 465-66. A
Michigan intermediate appellate court, considering a state law, concluded that a person was
not an illegal eavesdropper simply by secretly recording a conversation to which he was a
party. See Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). The court pointed
out that a recording is merely an accurate record of what was said. See id. at 60. It is never
certain that a participant in a conversation will not reveal what was said to others; no firmer
basis than mere hope can be found for an expectation of confidentiality. See id. For that
reason, the court wrote, a person should decide what to reveal in a conversation based on the
"individual's relation to the other participant. The individual may gauge his expectations
according to his own evaluation of the person to whom he speaks." Id.
137. See Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 79 (Cal. 1999). The court also
indicated that it might entertain a newsworthiness defense in future cases, although the issue
had not been decided below and presented for proper review. See id. at 79-80.
138. Some states, for example, have laws that say one thing, but judicial opinions that
interpret the statutes to impart a different gloss. Compare, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322,
(West 1986) (prohibiting private parties, but not law enforcement officials, from recording a
conversation without the permission of all parties), with Kirk v. Louisiana, 526 So. 2d 223,
226-27 (La. 1988) (holding that it is a violation of equal protection to allow prosecutors to
obtain the powerful evidence that recorded conversations can provide and deny that chance
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jurisdictions that allow a participant to a conversation to tape it
without the permission or knowledge of other parties as there are
those requiring permission from all participants." 9 A number of
to a defendant).
139. One-Party Jurisdictions (thirty-two states and the District of Columbia):
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1977).
Alaska: The Alaskan State Constitution makes Alaska a one-party state.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-3005 (1989).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-9-303 to -305 (1998).
District Of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-542 (1981).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (1999). This statute was clarified in
State v. Birge, 241 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. 1978).
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111 (1993).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18-6702 (1998).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 1998).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 to -4002 (1995). This statute was
clarified in State v. Roudybush, 686 P.2d 100 (Kan. 1984).
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010, 526.030 (Michie 1990).
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322 (West 1986). This is a two-party
statute that was declared unconstitutional in part in Kirk v. State,
526 So. 2d 223, 227 (La. 1988), thereby making Louisiana a one-
party consent state.
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 709-10 (1964 & West Supp.
1998).
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 750.539a-c (1991). The statute is ambiguous
and was clarified in Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60-61
(1982), which defined the law as being a single party consent law.
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (1999).
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-531 (1972).
Missouri: Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.402 (1972).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702 (1994).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.620 (1997).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-4 (West 1998).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-1, 30-12-122 (Michie 1978).
New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (Consol. 1984).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (1997).
Ohio: OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West 1998).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-35-21 (1998).
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 23A-35A-21 (Michie 1998).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (1997).
Texas: TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 123.002 (West 1998);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 1998).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (1995).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (Michie 1995).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-3 (1998).
Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. § 968.27 (1998).
Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-602 (Michie 1999).
Two-Party Jurisdictions (thirteen states):
California: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631, 632 (West 1999).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d (1999) (statutory tort enabled);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189 (1998) (felony listed).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1997).
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courts that have examined eavesdropping statutes have expressed
the view that, as one put it, "[o]ne party to a telephone communica-
tion has no right to force the other to secrecy, and, in fact, takes the
risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may
allow another to overhear the conversation."14 ° Interestingly, the
federal wiretapping law'4' at one time required consent of all parties
in order to record a conversation. 42 The statute was changed in
1986 to permit one party to tape without consent.' The reason
given for the changes was that Congress did not want to criminalize
interceptions by journalists used to gather information for news
stories.'
Florida: FLA. STAT. ch. "934.03 (1980).
Illinois: 720 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/14-2 (West 1993)
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 10-402 (1998).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 272, § 99 (1968).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (1999).
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-A-2 (1973).
Oklahoma: OELA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.4 (West 1998).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (1998).
Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (1981).
Washington: WASH. REv. CODE § 9.73.030 (1978)
Five states have no law on this point: Arkansas, Indiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Vermont.
140. Coates v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 677, 679 (E.D. Mo. 1970); see also
Commonwealth v. Eason, 694 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Mass. 1998); People v. Lucas 470 N.W.2d
460,467 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1993).
142. See ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONSPRIVACYACT, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(b) (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3571.
143. See id.
144. See S.REP.NO. 99-541, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,3571. That
report provides:
Many news stories have been brought to light by recording a conversation
with the consent of only one of the parties involved-often the journalist
himself ... The present wording ofSection 2511 (2) (d) not only provides [the
other party] with a right to bring suit, but it also makes the actions of the
journalist a potential criminal offense under Section 2511, even if the
interception was made in the ordinary course of responsible news-gathering
activities and not for the purpose of committing a criminal act or a tort. Such
a threat is inconsistent with the guarantees of the first amendment.
Id. In the past several years, legislation has been introduced that would once again change
federal law, this time by creating a uniform federal law outlawing the recording of phone
conversations without the consent of all parties. See The Telephone Privacy Act of 1999, S.
781, 106th Cong. (1999); The Telephone Privacy Act of 1998, S. 1973, 105th Cong.; The
Telephone PrivacyAct of 1993, S. 311, 103d Cong (1993). The sponsors of the legislation have
argued that a uniform law on wiretapping would be desirable to replace the potpourri of state
legislation, but they have not offered particularly clear rationales for why the preferred form
of the legislation should be one that requires all parties to consent. The legislators
emphasized the need to maintain the "intimacy" of phone conversations. In a press release,
Senator Diane Feinstein argued that secret recording "violates individual privacy and offends
common decency. Phone calls remain one of the few avenues of communication where people
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All of this suggests the deeply controversial nature of the intuition
that a legally cognizable privacy right of some kind is invaded
whenever undisclosed recording takes place. Of course, controver-
sial or not, the intuition may be correct. Perhaps the only problem
is that lawmakers have simply lagged behind in their ability to
articulate the precise nature of the harm. On that theory, one might
look to other bodies of expertise, particularly on psychology,
photography, art, and film, to see whether other disciplines may
provide insights that have eluded the law. Hypothetically, courts
might be segmenting the voice and the image from written or
spoken narrative because they sense that the capture of actual
voices and images of people and their surroundings occupies a subtle
but importantly different territory and the explanation may lie in
one of these other disciplines. Reference to this literature could
explain why recording ought to require separate consent, virtually
without regard to the circumstances or the location.
I cannot claim to have thoroughly mined the vast amount of
literature on film, photography, or recorded sound to its depths, but
after a fairly conscientious effort, I can say that I did not turn up the
missing piece. On the other hand, what I did find suggests some
additional considerations to weigh before deciding whether to
continue down the path staked out by Dietemann and retrod most
recently by Sanders and Food Lion.
1. A Search for Understanding
Visual and aural communications have always been a crucial part
of how we understand our world and the system of taboos through
which we try to control it. In a preliterate era, history and the
product of imagination were both conveyed from generation to
still feel safe enough to have intimate conversations. We should protect this expectation of
privacy." Sen. Diane Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Introduces Two Measures to Protect
Telephone Privacy, Press Release (Apr. 14,1999) (transcript available at<http'J/www.senate.
gov/feinstein/releases/phoneprivacybills.html>). It seems that Feinstein is not bothered so
much by the act of taping as by the revelation of intimate details, yet such revelations can
occur regardless of the legality of taping conversations.
It is already illegal to intercept phone calls on cellular phones. See 18 U.S.C.
2511(4)(b)(ii) (1999). But this sort of eavesdropping is distinguishable from the sort of
recording at issue in this article. It involves a classic case of the invisible third party whose
presence is not detectable by anyone involved in the conversation.
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generation by storytellers.'45 One can imagine that the sound of the
human voice, its inflections and its intonations, carried much of the
freight of the magic and mystery as tales were conveyed that, in the
oral tradition, carried forward the insights of a people into their
history and mythology. On a more prosaic level, modern lawyers,
too, invest the sound of the human voice with high significance,
recognizing that intonation and inflection are part of what differen-
tiates levels of meaning and conveys psychological clues about
sincerity or certainty or passion. 46 Despite the importance vested
in the sound of the human voice, however, most of the literature
dealing with the effects of mechanical recordation of the world
around us seems to have focused not on sound but on the psychic
and political significance of images in still photographs, film, and
television. Hence most of this discussion will center on the issue of
recorded imagery and what the richness of writing reveals about
attitudes toward its social and cultural significance.
Long before the camera was dreamed of, the making of images
had powerful and controversial significance. Depictions of humans
and animals have carried special meaning in spiritual life, in some
cases being greatly revered, while in others feared4 7 or avoided on
religious grounds.' Figurative imagery-the graven images of the
145. Perhaps the most famous practitioner of this oral tradition was Homer. Although
modern scholars have begun to suspect that Homer may have been literate and that he wrote
down at least some of the Iliad, he is generally agreed to have been a product of "a long
tradition of oral poetry." Bernard Knox, Introduction to HOMER, THE ILIAD 3, 19 (Robert
Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1488). Knox discusses the oral tradition in poetry and
the dispute over whether Homer wrote or transmitted the epic poem orally in his scholarly
introduction. See id. at 3-22.
146. For commentary on the "oral tradition" in law, see NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING
OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DisCOU RsE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BusINEss 18-20 (1985).
147. Susan Sontag wrote:
As everyone knows, primitive people fear that the camera will rob them of some
part of their being. In the memoir he published in 1900, at the end of a very
long life, Nadar reports that Balzac had a similar "vague dread" of being
photographed. His explanation, according to Nadar, was that "every bodyinits
natural state was made up of a series of ghostly images superimposed in layers
to infinity....[Ejach Daguerreian operation was therefore going to lay hold of,
detach, and use up one of the layers of the body on which it focused."
SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 158 (1977).
148. The great Paleolithic cave paintings, such as those at Altamira in Spain and Lascaux
in France, are thought to have had religious significance. See, e.g., DAvED M. ROBB & J.J.
GARRISON, ART IN THE WESTERN WORLD 581-82 (3d ed. 1953). The Marxist critic, Walter
Benjamin, wrote of religious or cultic art:
Artistic production begins with ceremonial objects destined to serve in a cult.
One may assume that what mattered was their existence, not their being on
view. The elk portrayed by the man of the Stone Age on the walls of his cave
was an instrument of magic. He did expose it to his fellow men, but in the main
it was meant for the spirits. Today the cult value would seem to demand that
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1185
Old Testament-for example, is barred from houses of worship by
Jews and Muslims but has traditionally been of great devotional
significance in the Roman Catholic Church.'49 And the making of
nonreligious representations, even by human hand, has also long
carried controversial cultural significance. Although the ancient
Greeks excelled in the representative arts, the philosopher Plato
was known to be scornful of artists as mere "magicians" and
"imitators."5 ° At the close of the twentieth century, it is clear that
we are still both entranced and troubled by our relationship to
images.
Both the pleasure gained from imagery and our continuing
suspicions of it have been amplified by the invention of mechanical
devices that capture, or seem to capture, reality itself. Among some
groups today, the taking of photographs is feared because the
capture of realistic images of people on films is thought to steal
some part of their essential being.'5 ' Although we understand from
this that the products, produced by technologies of reproduction may
touch and profoundly disturb the people who are its subjects, that
insight does not really provide an understanding of why a modern,
postindustrial culture like ours-which probably would dismiss such
ideation as "primitive"-ought to offer legal protection to people who
are photographed without their consent or even help us understand
why a claim to such protection has credence.
What may be of more relevance is the evidence of a deep cultural
ambivalence about the social and aesthetic changes wrought by still
photography, film, and television.'52 Literary and social commenta-
the work of art remain hidden. Certain statues of gods are accessible only to the
priest in the cella; certain Madonnas remain covered nearly all year round;
certain sculptures on medieval cathedrals are invisible to the spectator on
ground level.
WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 226-27 (Harry Zohn trans., 3d ed. 1968).
149. The ban on graven images might variously be explained as a bar against competing
with the creative power of God, or conversely against creating competing objects of worship.
On the other hand, imagery has been used to great artistic effect in Roman Catholic churches,
both to provides objects of reverence and to convey biblical stories to illiterate Christians.
Such was the power of prohibitions against representational art, however, that it took the
persuasion of such powerful figures as Pope Gregory I and Saint Thomas Aquinas to overcome
the prejudice against images in churches. See MITCHELL STEPHENS, THE RISE OF THE IMAGE,
THE FALL OF THE WORD 60-62 (1998). An interesting discussion of the relationship between
imagery and belief in divinity maybe found in Jean Baudrillard, The Precession ofSimulacra,
in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION 253, 255-57 (Brian Wallis ed.,
1984).
150. STEPHENS, supra note 149, at 60.
151. See SONTAG, supra note 147.
152. See BENJAMIN, supra note 148, at 224-25.
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tors almost uniformly share the belief that still and motion picture
photography is powerful, but they divide radically on whether the
power is a force for good or ill. Walter Benjamin, whose writings on
photography have become a classic, was captivated by the ability of
the camera to "penetrate deeply" into the web of life, rather than
maintain a painterly distance. 5 ' Nevertheless, he also understood
the prevalence of the photographic image as a way of depreciating
the thing itself.'54 Others have shared this observation, with
varying levels of dismay. 5 An early devotee of photography, Oliver
Wendell Holmes was nevertheless wistful in his concern that "[men
will hunt all curious, beautiful, grand objects, as they hunt the
cattle in South America, for their skins and leave the carcasses as
of little worth."'56 The French critic, Jean Baudrillard, has written
brilliantly about the way that modern photographic imagery has
acculturated us to accept Holmes's "skin" as substitute-perhaps a
preferred one-for actual experience.' Among his illustrations of
the point is the enormous popularity of Disney theme parks, places
where many people gather because they prefer the ersatz to the
real.158
Critics have also engaged in interpreting the "meaning" of
photographic images, fascinated and disturbed by the appearance
of reality that can easily mask the deeply interpretive nature of the
enterprise of making the picture. The task of learning to "read"
photographs and to understand their subtle distortions of reality
has engaged such perceptive and different writers as Susan Sontag
and Roland Barthes.' 59
Film is seen as presenting moral puzzles as well. Does the very
act of trying to capture people and events change reality or distort
it? Is it possible to capture people's lives on film without also
exploiting them? 6 ° Does exposure to imagery desensitize and
153. See id. at 233-34.
154. See id. at 231.
155. See id.
156. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Stereoscope and the Stereograph, in ON PHOTOGRAPHY:
A SOURCE BOOK OF PHOTO HISTORY IN FACSIMILE, 108, 118 (Beaumont Newhall ed., 1956).
157. See Baudrillard, supra note 149, at 261.
158. See id. at 258-62.
159. Roland Barthes, ThePhotographicMessage, inABARTHESREADER 194 (Susan Sontag
ed., 1982).
160. Several troubling examples of the effect of documentary film-making on the lives of
the subjects are recounted in Gary Dauphin, Burden of Dreams: Negotiating the Modern
Portrait Doc, VILLAGE VOICE, May 23, 1995, at 12. In addition to the Louds, he discusses the
young boys who were the subject of "Hoop Dreams" and the effect on the life of a woman of
an anthropological film made in 1978 by John Marshall, called "N!ai: A Story of a Kung
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deceive its viewers? Volumes have been written on the methodolo-
gies of film makers like Frederick Wiseman, who present their work
seemingly without comment but who are seen by some as purveyors
of hidden commentary and value judgments.' 6 '
Relationships between the camera and its subjects resist easy
understanding. People squirm at the thought of exposure by the
pitiless eye of the camera but carry cameras everywhere-as if events
that are unrecorded are events that have not occurred. The richest
symbol of this confused relationship with film is the Loud family.
The Loud family became famous when it let cameramen into their
home to produce 300 hours of broadcast on their daily lives-offering
the public what Jean Baudillard has termed "the thrill of the real,
... a thrill of vertiginous and phony exactitude."'62 The implication
is that, by hovering around the television set to watch the Louds, we
become consumers of objectified others.'63 Like the viewers of the
Truman Show, we are transformed into a collection of voyeurs, who
view prying as entertainment."6 The other piece of the puzzle, of
course, is that, although we might protest if asked that a venture
like the film on the Louds is fundamentally exploitative, the family
cooperated in the venture, willing to live with the camera as an
invisible but all-seeing eye.'65
What is obvious is that, as a society, we are profoundly unsettled
about our relationship with photographic imagery and deeply
Woman."
161. See, e.g., JACQUES AUMONT, BEYOND DOCUMENT: ESSAYS ON NONFICTION FILM
(Charles Warren ed., 1996); JACQUESAUMONT, THE IMAGE (Claire Pajackowska trans., 1997);
THOMAS W. BENSON & CAROLYN ANDERSON, REALITY FICTIONS: THE FILMS OF FREDERICK
WISEMAN (1989); BARRY KEITH GRANT, VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY: THE CINEMA OF FREDERICK
WISEMAN (1992); BILL NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1994); BILL NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY: ISSUES AND
CONCEPTS IN DOCUMENTARY (1991).
162. Baudrillard, supra note 149, at 271.
163. See id.
164. Journalism critic Russ Baker agrees about the thin line between information and
voyeurism, especially when hidden cameras are used to supply the footage. See Russ W.
Baker, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: 'PrimeTime Live' and the Hidden Camera, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1993, at 25.
Watching someone do virtually anything without their knowing can be
titillating. Daydreaming on the job, licking an envelope while looking around
nervously - innocent acts can seem dubious, even nefarious. Practitioners
know this. "It's no secret to anyone that this hidden-camera stuffintrigues the
viewers," says Kelly Ogle, investigative reporter at KWTV, a CBS affiliate in
Oklahoma City. "They like to see people doing things when they don't know
they're being watched."
Id. at 28.
165. See Baudrillard, supra note 149, at 271.
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ambivalent about its role in our lives. One way to explain this
discomfort is as a fear of change. The proliferation of new media in
the last century and a half have challenged our understandings of
art and intellect and social relations in disturbing ways. It should
not be a surprise that much of the legal turmoil over captured sound
and images in the press cases has occurred in the context of the
most controversial of the new media-television. Nor would it be a
surprise if it rose up again in some form as the Internet threatens
once more to change and destabilize our conventions of information
exchange.
Television has been accused of many crimes against civilization,
from changing us into passive dummies to converting our peaceable
children into lovers of violence. In intellectual circles-which judges,
like academics, inhabit-it is fashionable to decry the debilitating
effects of television on the minds and tastes of the public. And that
may color the view that is taken of the activities of reporters.
Historian Daniel Boorstin is an articulate representative of the
view that television and what it produces is irredeemably trivial.166
In his famous book, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in
America, he commented acerbically:
Ajuvenile critic recently said that television was "chewing gum for
the eyes."... We might say now that chewing gum is the television of
the mouth. There is no danger so long as we do not think that by
chewing gum we are getting nourishment. But the Graphic Revolution
has offered us the means of making all experience a form of mental
chewing gum, which can be continually sweetened to give us the
illusion that we are being nourished.
167
And Neil Postman has claimed that our television-moderated
"focus on the image has undermined traditional" ways of under-
standing and thinking about the world in which we live so that we
are now capable as a society of little more than "amusing ourselves
to death." 6 ' It would not be at all surprising if some of this
uncertainty, disdain, and episodic alarm about modern communica-
166. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 254
(Vintage Books 1st ed. 1992) (1961).
167. Id. at 258.
168. POSTMAN, supra note 146, at 74. Postman writes that "the early decades of the
twentieth century were marked by an outpouring of language and literature." Id. at 76-77.
That brilliance has now been replaced, thanks to the electronic media, with a "peek-a-boo
world, where now this event, now that, pops into view for a moment, then vanishes again. It
is a world without much coherence or sense." Id. at 77. He attributes most of the destructive
tendencies of which he speaks to television. See id. at 78.
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tions technologies might rub off on judges and juries and surface in
the form of an instinctive negative reaction to the use of cameras
and tape recorders by reporters.
It is important, therefore, to pause for a deep breath before
translating "image anxiety" into legal rules. It may well be that
most of what seems profoundly disturbing and offensively trivial
today in the media reflects a period of cultural dislocation rather
than a genuine evil that needs to be controlled. Mitchell Stephens,
in a wise new book, makes a persuasive argument that our suspicion
of images is indeed a fuiction of this sort of temporary psychic
dislocation.'69 And he points out that overreaction, fear, and anger
have accompanied each major revolution in communications
technologies, whether it be the invention of the printing press or the
invention of the Internet. 7 ° Each change must be processed, often
for a century or more, before we can put the virtues and the costs of
the new modality into something like appropriate perspective.''
Stephens wrote:
Words were born with humankind-perhaps a hundred thousand or even
as long as a million years ago. To be human, for those unencumbered by
disability, is to use and understand words. Most of what we can sense, feel
or imagine we can express through language. Can we think without
language? This question has perplexed many generations of undergradu-
ates, but certainly it can be agreed that without language most of us could
not think about much. Perhaps that is some of what the Gospel according
to John has in mind when it reports, "In the beginning was the Word."
This is the first reason that talk of the fall of the word causes so much
anxiety. At stake is not simply one form of communication; at stake is the
way we think, where we begin.' 2
Is it possible that the real evil of unconsented filming is its
novelty, its "untextness"?
169. See STEPHENS, supra note 149.
170. See id. at 65-78.
171. That such a sense of dislocation plays a part in the attitude of the courts is hinted at
by the opinion in Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). The opinion
made special note ofthe "problem" posed by recording and transmitting devices in the modem
era:
More generally, the dominance of the visual image in contemporary culture
and the technology that makes it possible to capture and, in an instant,
universally disseminate a picture or sound allows us, and leads us to expect,
to see and hear what our great-grandparents could have known only through
written description.
Id. at 473-74.
172. STEPHENS, supra note 149, at 16.
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2. A Few Pragmatic Observations
The very fact that visual imagery, particularly film footage,
generates such visceral reactions is ample reason to hesitate before
acting on those reactions. To the extent that negative attitudes
toward mechanically-captured imagery result from our deep psychic
ties to the word, or from some temporary cultural identity crisis
through the threat they pose to understandings based on the written
word, courts are inappropriate arbiters of the conflict. If people fear
images because they are a powerful, partial, incompetent, deceptive,
or unflattering method of conveying information, that, too, is a
cultural debate that I would have thought the First Amendment left
to be worked out in the public arena. Deconstructing film is not the
realm of law.
Let me add a few other pragmatic considerations, as well.
Although it may be tempting to "put down" a preference for visual
imagery over text as a sign that the consumer has lamentable taste
for sensationalism or a lack of intellectual rigor, to do so ignores the
importance of pictures as a way to absorb new information and
understand its meaning. Among illiterate people, imagery is
especially important because it is, by necessity, a primary medium
for the distribution and acquisition of knowledge. Much of the
writing of media gurus like Marshall McLuhan was generated by
excitement at the possibilities offered by modern photographic and
audiovisual media for dissemination of information and values, as
well as political ideas, across geographic and cultural lines.'73
Within societies that are largely literate, however, information
conveyed by pictures and images does not lose its saliency.
Cognitive psychologists have had a long-standing interest in the
ways learning occurs from pictures. They agree that images can be
173. McLuhan recognized this possibility for the electronic media and captured it in the
phrase, "the global village." He wrote:
Our specialist and fragmented civilization of center-margin structure is
suddenly experiencing an instantaneous reassembling ofall its mechanized bits
into an organic whole. This is the new world of the global village.... The
electronic age cannot sustain the very low gear of a center-margin structure
such as we associate with the past two thousand years of the Western world.
MARSHALLMcLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 93 (1965). A second
major figure in understanding the way in which the modern pictorial and audiovisual media
have changed the way we view ourselves and our place in the global context is Ithiel de Sola
Pool. See POLITICS IN WIRED NATIONS: SELECTED WRITINGS OF ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL (Lloyd
S. Etheredge ed., 1998).
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an important source of information for people who do not respond
well to text. But even for those who learn well from the written
word, researchers now suspect that imagery remains an important
adjunct to comprehension. A number of researchers are now
working on understanding how exposure to images may reinforce,
supplement, or perform different cognitive functions than text.74
Numerous other scholars from a variety of disciplines also either
celebrate the potential of modern visual media, or at least acknowl-
edge that, on balance, it makes a positive social contribution.
Walter Benjamin, for example, argued that film is a progressive
form of expression because it allows an appeal directly to the
masses, rather than requiring that the reception of art be mediated
through an elitist, intellectual hierarchy. 7 ' Susan Sontag, in her
book on photography, points out that "populist" newspapers like the
New York Daily News advertise themselves as the "picture newspa-
pers," whereas a more elite publication like Le Monde uses no
photographs at all.'76 "The information that photographs can give,"
she wrote, "starts to seem very important at that moment in
cultural history when everyone is thought to have a right to
something called news. Photographs were seen as a way of giving
information to people who do not take easily to reading.""'
Although Sontag takes issue with a simplistic view regarding
photographs as "information," she does not quarrel with, or take
offense at, the claim that different people respond more or less
favorably to different kinds of inputs.
7 8
A second, quite different, pragmatic consideration is whether,
when the law punishes the press for unconsented recording, the real
message is that subjects should have a legal right to deny the
accuracy of what the press reports, even though it is entirely correct.
In Sanders, for example, it seems as if the plaintiffs real objective
was to be able to hide how he earned his living from the large
segments of the community that would not have found his occupa-
tion especially admirable. That is a peculiar interest for the law to
protect. The Sanders court decided to do so, however, at least in
174. See, e.g., Sylvie Molitor et al. Problems in Knowledge Acquisition from Text and
Pictures, in ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY (58): KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION FROM TEXT AND
PICTUREs 3, 4-5 (Heinz Mandl & Joel R. Levin eds., 1989). The authors attribute to the
Renaissance in Europe a preference for images over "scholastic knowledge in books." Id. The
task of modern psychology is to understand how learning from imagery takes place and how
such learning relates to learning from texts and words. See id. at 6.
175. See BENJAMIN, supra note 148, at 233-35.
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part because it concluded that "outing" the activities of
"telepsychics" was too trivial to justify either the reporter's
deception or the embarrassment caused by the plaintiff by showing
him in a truthful light.
One could quarrel, as I do, with that judgment and with the
appropriateness of a court's making it. But I think it would be hard
for most people to accept as a right the claim to be defended against
the truth where the interest of the plaintiff, bluntly, is to hide from
the world as much as possible behavior that is clearly, or at least
arguably, genuinely discreditable. Dietemann, whether he thought
it was wrong or not, was practicing medicine without a license and
was convicted for doing so. Food Lion never disputed that the
broadcast scenes showing food being mishandled were accurate. 179
When evidence of criminal, unethical or unsafe practices is captured
on film and tape, it can be a powerful force for reform.' ° As a
society, we should have some discomfort at the idea that corpora-
tions and people who, in their public, commercial and professional
roles are themselves engaged in questionable or illegal practices are
179. See Russ W. Baker, Damning Undercover Tactics as Rraud" Can Reporters LieAbout
Who They Are? The Food Lion Jury Says No, COLUmi. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
28. Baker makes the point that, although some of the outtakes did suggest that the reporters
were looking for material in the Food Lion case to support their story line, the footage
actually broadcast was legitimately damning of Food Lion's practices. See id. at 31. He also
notes that the reporters had on-the-record interviews with 70 current and past Food Lion
employees attesting to unsafe practices at more than 200 store locations, in addition to other
interviews that were off the record. See id. at 32. One of the most troubling aspects of Baker's
report, however, was the indication that the jury may have been influenced in finding
liability by prejudice against the North and New York City, as well as by subtle anti-
Semitism. See id. at 32-33. Whether or not he is correct, his suspicion supports the argument
that courts need to ground their theories of liability, and the damage awards that flow from
them, on solid, rational grounds to avoid the risk of serious unfairness and a chilling of future
speech. See id. at 34.
180. Sontag points out that, to be affected by a photographic image, one needs a "relevant
political consciousness" and that photographs alone do not create "moral position[si." SONTAG,
supra note 147, at 16-21. 1 take the point, but do not understand her to belittle the power of
photographs by making it. Although unconsented and secret filming is controversial among
journalists themselves, many agree that the results are often beneficial. One writer,
discussing the aftermath of the Titcut Follies injunction, see supra note 27 and accompanying
text, pointed out that the legal bar to showing the film was lifted only after a suit by the
families of inmates who died in the Massachusetts institution for the criminally insane as a
result of poor care. "Shunned by most organizations representing the mentally ill, these
vulnerable men cannot protectthemselves. Prying eyes are theirbest defense." Miriam Horn,
Shining a Light on Their Follies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1993, at 20. For a
similar example, see Goodman, supra note 96, at E8 (describing revelations, partly through
use of a hidden camera, of abuses in a for-profit chain of psychiatric hospitals).
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nonetheless allowed to use powerful and broadly-defined tort
theories as weapons to protect themselves against scrutiny.
18 1
An additional pragmatic consideration I would like to raise is the
value that inheres in documentation. After all, reporters sometimes
lie. In recent history, several prominent journalists have lost jobs,
and one was even required to return a Pulitzer prize, because they
had made up some or all of their stories. 82 Recordings are proof
against that form of deception. Hopefully, however, the more
important role for audio and video tapes is to provide protection
against unjustified claims that the reporter has lied."'83 Clearly,
without documentary proof, a source wishing to back out of a
revelation is free to deny that she ever did or said such a thing, or
181. There are many other examples of possible malfeasance on the part of plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., Civ. No. 94-590 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 1994)
(granting an order for a temporary injunction), motion for stay denied sub nom; CBS, Inc. v.
Davis, No. 18637 (S.D. Feb. 8, 1994), stay granted, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) (Blackmun,
Circuit Justice) (holding that footage from an investigation of alleged unsanitary practices in
meat industry could not be enjoined because of concern about the constitutionality of prior
restraints); Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (exposing improper treatment
in opthalmology clinics); Belluomo v. KAKE TV, 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (involving
health code violations in restaurant); Special Force Ministries v. WCCO TV, 26 Media. L. Rep.
CBNA 2490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (investigating questionable care in residential facilities
for the mentally retarded). Journalists disagree over whether a ban on unconsented or secret
recording would hamper effective investigative reporting. See, e.g., Paterno, supra note 17,
at 40; see also Perry, supra note 17 (also describing the debate). Paterno addresses the debate
by both quoting a reporter from the New York Times who claimed that undercover reporting
was usually bad reporting and, at the same time, pointing to examples of award-winning
journalists who engaged in deceptive conduct to get important stories. See Paterno, supra
note 17, at 43-44. Paterno makes the point-true in my experience-that most critics of hidden
cameras and undercover reporting are from the print media. See id. at 43. "But," she adds,
"television needs pictures. And pictures drive reporters undercoverfor dramatic, indisputable
evidence ofwrongdoing. 'Often the results are wonderful,' says SUNYpress historian [Robert]
Miraldi. 'And I don't mean ratings. I mean the changes that result socially.'" Id. at 44.
182. A Washington Post reporter, Janet Cooke, won and then lost a Pulitzer prize for
making up an article about an eight-year-old heroin addict, entitled Jimmy's World. See
Robert Reinhold, Washington Post Gives Up Pulitzer, Calling Article on Addict, Fiction, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1981, atAl. Recently, other reporters, including Boston's Mike Barnicle, have
fallen into disrepute for making up characters or other aspects of stories. See Felicity
Barringer, Boston Globe Columnist Resigns OverAuthenticity of1995 Story, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 1998, at Al.
183. Professor Paul LeBel has said:
One might hypothesize that there is a significant First Amendment interest in
the activity of hidden recording that is different from and perhaps stronger than
the interest in mere presence on the part of a reporter. The additional credibility
associated with the images and the sounds that are recorded in an encounter of
this sort contributes to the public information about the matter in question in a
more meaningful and dramatic way than an account of the encounter that is
unsupported by film or tape.
LeBel, supra note 48, at 1160.
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to claim that, if she did say it, she was being facetious."8 4 A
recording of the exchange allows listeners and viewers (or jurors, if
it comes to that) to draw their own conclusions. 185  To use one
prominent example, let us think back to the Lewinsky-Tripp tapes
that played such a prominent role in the Clinton impeachment
proceedings. I would, on balance, have preferred never to have
known most of the sordid details they contained. But since I was
going to learn about their contents anyway in excruciating detail, it
clearly seems better to me to have had the opportunity to examine
the transcripts and hear the voices than to allow the information to
be filtered to me through the lens of partisan players in the
controversy.
In the end, the claim that secret (or unconsented) recording of the
kind at issue here is a clear moral and legal wrong is not obvious.
That is not to say that, under some circumstances, the behavior
probably ought to be proscribed. If the recording and its subsequent
publication occurs in a relationship that carries with it some special,
clearly understood expectation of confidentiality, for example, the
appropriateness of a tort remedy might be clearer. In Shulman v.
Group W Productions, Inc.,186 to use one example, the Supreme
Court of California was faced with the existence of such a relation-
ship and was able to use it to draw a narrow and intelligible line
between the impermissible and the merely controversial. 8 ' There,
the reporters were preparing a documentary on the work done by
emergency rescue squads, and arranged to have a cameraman in a
184. As Judge Posner once trenchantly observed, privacy claims are often attempts on the
part of plaintiffs to perpetrate fraud by maintaining a public image they do not"deserve." See
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397-400 (1978).
185. See Marc Gunther, The Lion's Share, 19 AM. JoURNALIsM REV. 18 (1997). This point
is actually made by journalism commentators who are not enamored of the tactics discussed
in this article. Marc Gunther, for example, does not approve of undercover reporting, but he
notes that the public may not agree. See id. He reports that ABC, after it lost two cases
involving such tactics, took a poll and found that
network magazine shows get very high ratings for "ethics and honesty," higher
than local newspapers and the news media overall and much higher than the
Clinton administration or politicians in general. Seventy-two percent of
respondents said they thought TVinvestigative reporters are "careful and fair,"
and more than half approve of the use of undercover reporters.
Id. at 23. Russ Baker is also critical of the reporting techniques of television news
magazines, in particular those ofPrimeTime Live-a show that uses undercover techniques
more than any comparable show. Nevertheless, he concludes: "Viewers of hidden-camera
journalism serve as their own eyewitnesses. 'Seeing is believing,' says NBC field producer
Bob Windrem, who spent a dozen years each in TV and print. 'That's why television has
higher credibility with the public than print.'" Baker, supra note 164, at 25, 34.
186. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
187. See id. at 477.
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rescue helicopter and a wireless microphone attached to a flight
nurse."' 8 The victim of an automobile accident could be heard
speaking with the nurse during her evacuation from the accident
scene, presumably unaware that every word was being recorded.
189
Medical personnel owe a special responsibility toward a patient,
whether in an ambulance, a rescue helicopter, or a hospital room,
that generally includes a respect for the patient's privacy and
confidences. A tort recovery against a media entity for invading
that special relationship is consistent with basic principles of the
law of privacy and would be a wrong with or without the use of
hidden recording equipment.'90
There can be other specific problems with the content of a picture
or a sound recording that I suspect would also generally be conceded
by all sides to create valid grounds for recovery. For example, use
of a recorded voice or face might expose its owner, under some
circumstances, to a serious risk of danger.'9 ' Or it might reveal
something that, were the facts merely reported verbally, would not
expose the plaintiff so intimately.'92 People might not object to
appearing scantily clad in front of people they know well in what
they think is the "privacy" of their home but a secret photograph of
them in that condition might legitimately be treated as quite a
different form of revelation.193
But without specific circumstances to justify and render intelligi-
ble the court's decision, bans on mechanical recordation of things
that can legitimately be reported deserve a skeptical reception.
188. See id. at 475-76.
189. See id. at 476.
190. One of the best known privacy cases is Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.
1942). The case is generally conceded to involve a genuinely offensive form of intrusion,
partaking of all the characteristics that render trespasses into homes or peeping through
windows out-of-bounds in our society. See id. at 295-96.
191. This problem is occasionally faced by courts when reporters want to televise all or
part of a trial. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock, supra note 25, at 705. It has also
been discussed as a factor in some of the covert recording cases.
192. See id.
193. Some feeling for what I mean can be gleaned from the facts of one of the so-called
ride-along cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. Reporters accompanied law
enforcement personnel into a house to execute a warrant. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111,
113 (4th Cir. 1998), affd, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1695-96 (1999). The occupants, who were sleeping
when the police arrived, were photographed dressed in underpants and a sheer nightgown.
See Wilson, 141 F.3d at 113, affd, 119 S. Ct. at 1696. Arguably, merely describing the way
they were dressed would convey a qualitatively different kind of information from secretly
photographing them and making the film public. Cf Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983) (reporting a case where the owner ofa roller-skating rink installed see-through
panels in the ceiling of the women's restroom).
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Focusing on the equipment of reporting as a wrong when the content
produced by it is legally impeccable ought to raise a suspicion that
courts and juries are simply evading the strictures of the First
Amendment to punish the press when they do not approve of the
report's conclusions or choice of target.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reason, and not emotion, ought to drive the development of the
law about newsgathering. As this article has tried to show, it is
difficult at present to be sure that reasoned grounds exist for the
harsh treatment that has been meted out in recent years to press
entities that have engaged in undercover reporting. That is not to
say that penalties for unacceptable behavior ought never be imposed
on the press, but rather to counsel caution against the risk of over-
reacting to provocative, but not clearly antisocial, behavior in the
course of newsgathering. Beyond question, the media uses bad
judgment and sometimes indiscriminately wields weapons that
squash flies as well as monsters. "Investigative" reportage is often
flashy and insubstantial. The desire for profit may drive the take-
no-prisoners behavior of an aggressive press as often as a zeal for
justice. But distaste for press tactics alone is not a justification for
large damage awards. Courts ought to promulgate firm rules
against press misconduct only if a convincing rationale can be
offered for why the excess in question would be beyond the pale for
any of us.
Beyond that, the appropriate approach may be to hold our
collective noses and leave the decision about what is fair play to
work itself out on the field of ethics and public opinion. Messiness
and mendacity are as much a product of a free press as are its
valiant crusades and mind-opening revelations, and a mature
society probably has to learn to live with that tension, if not exactly
to love it.
On this point, I can do no better than to quote from that supreme
rationalist, Chief Judge Richard Posner. In a recent decision,
declining to overturn a trial court verdict in favor of the defendant
where both hidden identities and surreptitious recording were used
by investigative reporters, Judge Posner (with or without a hard
swallow I cannot tell) wrote: "[I]f the broadcast itself does not
contain actionable defamation, and no established rights are
invaded in the process of creating it... then the target has no legal
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remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the network are
surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly."'94
194. Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
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